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ABSTRACT 
The thesis analyzes the rise of a political outsider in Venezuela, a country 
previously dominated by candidates from a strong and consolidated democratic party 
system. This thesis examines three dimensions-institutional, economic, and cultural-to 
find interrelated elements that explain the Hugo Chavez Frias' presidential victory in 
1998. The findings suggest that the Venezuelan political culture constantly fosters 
military participation in· politics. For many years, this impulse was contained by an 
institutionalized party system. However, poor economic performance by political leaders 
led to the decreasing govemability and political instability in the 1990s, and the decay of 
the institutionalized party system, which created the opportunity for Hugo Chavez Frias 
to win the 1998 presidential election. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the rise of a political outsider in a country previously 
dominated by candidates from a strong and consolidated party system. It hypothesizes 
that this political phenomenon is a by-product of the political leadership's failure to 
address the social, economic, and political needs and demands of the Venezuelan 
population. This led to the deinstitutionalization of the party system and of civilian 
control over the military. 
As a single case study, this thesis investigates three dimensions-institutional, 
economic, and cultural-to explain the presidential victory of Hugo Chavez Frfas. The 
institutional perspective suggests why the two-party system, established following the 
1958 democratic transition, degenerated into a inefficient, inefficacious, and illegitimate 
"partyarchy." It also explains why a progressive deinstitutionalization of the two-party 
system encouraged the emergence of political outsiders. The economic perspective 
explores political decisions and events that explain why a country with enormous oil 
revenues developed unsuccessfully, socially and economically. It also analyzes why the 
failed economic performance of the Venezuelan political class led to a 
deinstitutionalization of the party system. Finally, the cultural approach discusses the 
Venezuelan armed forces' inherited custom of participating in politics, and how this 
participation materialized as the 1992 coup attempts, paving the way for Hugo Chavez 
Frias' presidential victory in the elections on December, 61h 1998. 
ix 
This thesis argues the military's tradition of participating in Venezuela's political 
life has represented a constant challenge to the survival of democratic regimes. The 
armed forces have often seen politicians as incapable of ruling the country. However, 
since 1958, by means of a political pact designed to distribute oil revenues to develop the 
country, the traditional parties (AD and COPEI) achieved institutionalization, ensuring a 
stable degree of govemability. Nevertheless, once the political class tied itself to 
corruption and mismanagement and failed to further development, sentiments against the 
political establishment arose. Urban riots and military uprisings were the violent 
responses to a discredited two-party system. Later, a progressive deintitutionalization of 
the party system accelerated as voters decided to no longer support traditional parties. 
This allowed Hugo Chavez Frias, a former coup leader with scant political background, 
to be elected president in 1998. 
X 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
I would like to acknowledge the support of Professor Harold A. Trinkunas and 
Professor Jeanne K. Giraldo, my two advisors. Their academic support, their opportune 
advice, dedication, and their knowledge helped greatly to complete this thesis. Finally, I 
want to thank my wife, Isamery, and my son, Luis Manuel, for their constant support 
throughout my pursuit of my Master's degree. I acknowledge and appreciate their 
sacrifice, their patience, and overall their love. 
xi 




This thesis examines the rise of a political outsider in a country previously 
dominated by candidates from a strong and consolidated party system. It hypothesizes 
that this political phenomenon is a by-product of the political leadership's failure to 
address social, economic, and political demands. 1 This thesis further investigates three 
dimensions-institutional, economic, and cultural-to explain Hugo Chavez Frias' 
presidential victory in Venezuela in 1998. As Anibal Romero points out, the factors that 
must be considered to explain political changes in Venezuela are "economic (falling oil 
prices and the eroding distributive capacity of the state, cultural (the predominance of a 
paternalistic culture ... ), and institutional (corruption and the reduced capacity of political 
parties)."2 First, by using an institutional approach, this thesis will show how the two-
party system, established since the 1958 democratic transition, degenerated into an 
inefficient, and illegitimate "partyarchy." The second perspective, the economic, will 
assess the political decisions and events that explain why Venezuela, a country that had 
enormous oil revenues, became a "poor rich country," with extreme poverty and 
inequality. Finally, using a cultural approach, it will explain why Hugo Chavez and his 
military colleagues decided to intervene violently in politics during the two failed coups 
1 Linz, Juan J., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 45. 
2 Romero, Anibal, "Venezuela: Democracy Hangs On," Journal of Democracy, v. i4, 1996, p. 31. 
1 
.. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
d'etat in 1992, and why this non-democratic political participation was crucial in paving 
the way for his victory in the presidential elections on December 6, 1998? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Following the overthrow of General Marcos Perez Jimenez's authoritarian regime 
in January 1958, Venezuelans established what many considered an exceptionally stable 
democracy.4 During the last four decades, an institutionalized party system5 in 
combination with advantageous economic revenues coming from oil production ensured a 
solid govemability for democratically elected leaders. 6 Likewise, the pacted nature of the 
Venezuelan democratic transition, which was characterized by easy and fast settlements 
among political elites without major involvement of the armed forces/ contributed to a 
suitable civilian control over military. 8 
3 Loveman, Brian, For Ia Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington, DE, 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999, xiv. 
4 McCoy, Jennifer, "Venezuela: Crisis de Confianza," in Andres Serbin, Andres Stambouli, Jennifer 
McCoy, and William Smith, eds. Venezuela: Ia Democracia Bajo Presion, Instituto Venezolano de 
Estudios Sociales y Politicos (INVESP), (Miami, Fl, North-South Center, Universidad de Miami, 
Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1993), p.11. 
5 Komblith, Miriam and Levine, Daniel "Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System," in Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin 
America, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 39. 
6 Karl, Terry L., The Paradox of.Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, (Berkeley, Ca, University of ~ 
California Press, 1997), p. 3. 
7 Peeler, John, "Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela," 
in John Higley and Richard Gunter, eds. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and 
Southern Europe, (New York, N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 102. 
8 Trinkunas, Harold A., Crafting Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Political Conflict, Institutional 
Design and Military Subordination in Emerging Democracies, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 
Stanford, Ca, October, 1998, p.p. 20-21. 
2 
However, the popular civilian uprisings of February 1989 and the two military 
coup attempts of 1992 were unequivocal signs of a severe deterioration of the efficacy 
(i.e., the capacity to fmd solutions) and effectiveness (i.e., the capacity to implement 
policies formulated) of the Venezuela democratic regime, almost leading to its 
breakdown.9 Here, the same political class-perniciously related to the economic elite-that 
Venezuelans once trusted to lead the country along a path of economic, social and 
political fairness, and equity, did exactly the opposite.1° Corruption, nepotism, and 
patrimonialism were the day-to-day modus operandi and also vivendi ofpoliticians, while 
poverty and social inequality grew. This environment progressively discredited the 
legitimacy of the democratic regime, which manifested itself through increasing levels of 
electoral abstention. 11 
This popular disenchantment provided an opportunity for Hugo Chavez, a former 
lieutenant colonel and the leader of two failed coup attempts in 1992, to participate in 
politics, but now in a pacific way. As a result, Hugo Chavez was elected president on 
December 1998, which meant the end of the two-party system and its strong influence in 
determining access to power. 12 
9 Linz, p.p. 16, 20, 22. 
10 McCoy, p.12. 
11 Komblith and Levine, p. 62. 
12 Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Timothy R., eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin 
America, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 5. 
3 
C. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a single case study, this thesis focuses on this political phenomenon in 
Venezuela in order to generate hypotheses that could be relevant for other democratizing 
or degenerating regimes. It examines party institutionalization, economic development, 
and the political culture of the military to build a comprehensive explanation of the Hugo 
Chavez phenomenon in Venezuela. 
The institutional dimension of this explanation builds the arguments of Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in 
Latin America to show why a progressive deinstitutionalization of the two-party system 
encouraged the emergence of political outsiders (individuals and groups). In explaining 
this issue, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully hold: 
Where the party system is more institutionalized, parties are key actors 
that structure the political process; where it is less institutionalized, 
parties are not so dominant, they do not structure the political process as 
much, and politics tends to be less institutionalized and therefore more 
unpredictable. Democratic politics is more erratic, establishing 
legitimacy is more difficult, and governing is more complicated.13 
The study shows how an institutionalized party system, and in particular, a pacted 
political class, hindered the achievement of any real economic development in the 
Venezuelan oil-state over the last forty years. Terry L. Karl in The Paradox of Plenty 
argues that "a democracy by pact can institutionalize a conservative bias into the polity, 
creating a new status quo that can block further progress toward political, social, and 
13 Mainwaring and Scully, p. 22. 
4 
economic development."14 In addition, Karl traces economic mismanagement and 
corruption to the ability of politicians to rely on oil revenue: 
Because rents are extraordinary in oil states, government officials have 
additional capacity to extract unusually high income from their resource 
without added investment. ... These rents mold the government, especially 
its jurisdiction, meaning its scope or degree of intervention in the 
economy, and its authority, meaning its ability to penetrate society ... 15 
In the case of the oil booms (1973 and 1983), they not only represented a barrier 
for further economic development, but also encouraged political decay. Karl states: 
Oil booms are likely to have pernicious effects in this context by 
dramatically exacerbating petrolization ... and further weakening the state 
capacity. Thus they lead to economic decline and regime destabilization 
while creating the illusion that they are doing exactly the opposite. 16 
The failure of the traditional parties to develop the country economically and, in 
particular, their inability to carry out sustained economic reforms in the 1990s contributed 
to the deinstitutionalization of the party system. As Juan J. Linz and other students of 
democracy have argued, increasing ineffectiveness and inefficacy is likely to lead to a 
deep illegitimacy and loss of electoral support for responsible parties. As Linz states: 
Legitimacy is granted or withdrawn by each member of the society day 
in and day out... Regimes therefore enjoy more or less legitimacy just by 
existing. Gains and losses of support for governments, leaders, parties, 
and policies in a democracy are likely to fluctuate rapidly while the 
belief in legitimacy of the system persists. There is clearly an interaction 
between the support for the regime and that for the governing parties, 
which in the absence of other indicators leads to the use of electoral 
returns and public opinion responses as indirect evidence of the 
legitimacy of the system. Consequently, the loss of support for all 
14 Karl, p. 15. 
15 Karl, p.p. 14-15. 
16 Karl, p. 17. 
5 
political actors is likely to lead to an erosion of legitimacy... of a 
particular political system ... 17 
Finally, the thesis explains how a former military leader was able to take 
advantage of the deinstitutionalized party system to be elected president. It builds on 
Brian Loveman' s argument that the culture of Latin America militaries makes them prone 
to intervene in politics. His argument about military's belief of strongly connected to the 
founding and development of Latin America countries in the Independence Wars of the 
nineteenth century explain why military carried out coup d'etat attempts in 1992. This in 
conjunction with the use of Bolivarian symbolism would eventually pave the way for his 
presidential victory in the 1998 elections. Moreover, his argument adds insightful 
explanations concerning why members and ex-members are seen by both and themselves, 
and the population as the savors of la patria. 18 In explaining this issue, Loveman argues: 
The military acts when the judgment is made that governments have put 
la patria at risk. By the time this judgment is made public, the military 
coup-makers commonly }lave the support of some key civilian groups, or 
even of a majority of the civilian population ... 19 
D. IMPORTANCE 
Venezuela, as an important oil producer and supplier with a relative well-
established democracy, is a point of reference for other countries worldwide with similar 
political circumstances, and analogous institutional, economic, and cultural backgrounds. 
Likewise, this case can be used to examine the possible emergence of a new electoral 
17 Linz, p.p. 17-18. 
18 Loveman, xiv. 
19 Ibid. 
6 
trend in Latin American countries, given the similarity with political phenomena, such as 
the case of Peru, where an unexpected electoral outcome led to the election of Alberto 
Fujimori and the end of an institutionalized party system. 
·E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II addresses the evolution of the party system in Venezuela and to what 
extent its institutionalization and deinstitutionalization affected the political stability of 
Venezuela. 
Chapter III reviews the political performance of the pacted political elite on 
economic issues since the 1958 democratic transition. It discusses the most important 
economic decisions and events of the time period, emphasizing the events surrounding 
the two failed military uprisings and the election of Chavez. 
Chapter IV addresses the cultural heritage of the Venezuela military in 
participating in politics and its eventual influence in the 1998 electoral outcome by means 
of an analysis of its chronological evolution since the Conquest period. 
Finally, Chapter V offers the conclusions on why and how the economic, cultural, 
and institutional approaches explain the political phenomenon of Hugo Chavez' 
presidential victory. 
7 
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II. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF HUGO CHAVEZ FRIAS' 
PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY 
In Venezuela, a solid institutionalization of a party system had contributed to the 
establishment ofwhat many authors considered a model of stability. Since 1958, after ten 
years of an infamous dictatorship, an institutionalized party system based on stable 
interparty competition, strong roots in society, legitimacy among the population, and 
stable rules and structures had ensure a total two-party hegemony. Likewise, the pacted 
nature ofthe Venezuelan democratic transition, characterized by easy and fast settlements 
among political elites without major involvement of the armed forces, contributed to a 
suitable civilian control over the military. However, a progressive deinstitutionalization 
as a result of an increasing lack of efficacy, effectiveness, and illegitimacy of the two-
party system, threatened the stability of the regime, compounded by popular civilian 
uprisings of February 1989 and two military coup attempts in 1992. 
Thus, when looking for factors that can explain the political phenomenon of Hugo 
Chavez' presidential victory, the institutional approach provides important elements for 
such a purpose. Once assessed how the institutionalization of political organizations, as 
parties and party system, stabilize and preserve political systems, especially democracies, 
it is possible to explain why the progressive deinstitutionalization of the Venezuelan two-
party system led not only to a near democratic breakdown in 1992, but also to the 1998 
presidential victory of Hugo Chavez Frias, a political outsider. 
9 
For this purpose, this chapter is divided in three sections. The first section will 
assess theoretical concepts concerning parties, party systems, and institutionalization in 
order to understand what conditions existed in Venezuela that facilitated the 
institutionalization of a two-party system. The second section will analyze how the 
institutionalization of the party system facilitated a democratic transition in 1958, and led 
to the formation of a dominant two-party system, which ensured the formation of a stable 
democracy. In this case, the democratic parties of Acci6n Democratica (AD) and the 
Comite de Organizaci6n Polftica Electoral Independiente, or COPEI (Christian 
Democratic Party) by means of a stable interparty competition, strong roots in society, 
legitimacy among the population, and stable rules and structures would ensure a total 
hegemony until the 1993 presidential election. The third section will show how a 
progressive deterioration in the two-party system's effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy 
undermined its previous convocational capacity within the population, which contributed 
to the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a political phenomenon in 1998. 
A. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM 
According to March and Olsen, political institutions are a "collection of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, 
what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligation of that role in that situation is."20 In 
other words, the emergence of such institutions has responded to the human nature of 
20 March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," 
American Political Science Review, v. 78, 1984, p.p. 738-749. 
10 
creating collective organizations to foster rational behavior while channeling social, 
economic, and political needs. 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo define political institutions in terms of 
organizations for representing society's interest ranging from formal government 
structures (legislatures) through legal institutions (electoral laws), and through promoters 
of common ideological values (political parties).21 Moreover, in society's constant 
struggle for engagement with the state, political parties have been one of the most 
dominant political institutions in the majority of the countries?2 Political parties have 
provided for their members and for the society the opportunity to gain office and to 
influence public policy by controlling offices directly. In one-party communist, fascist or 
authoritarian regimes, the party structure and government are not easily. distinguishable 
and the role of the opposition parties is very limited or null. In contrast, in democratic 
regimes, parties are the core institutions through which the people select their leaders 
from among competing elites, meaning organized groups led by politicians.23 As Michael 
Coppedge argues, "no democracy of any size can function without parties. "24 
The structure of individual parties tells only part of the story. The individual 
parties function within party systems, which in developed countries, tend to be structured 
21 Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in S .. 
Steinmo and F. Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics: Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.p. 2-4. 
22 Peters, B. Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism,' PINTER, 1999, p. 
113. 
23 Lipset, Seymour Martin, "What Are Parties for?" Journal of Democracy, v. 7.1, 1996, p.p. 169-170 
24 Coppedge, Michael, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in 
Venezuela, (Stanford, Ca, Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 18 
11 
and relatively stable, so that if an individual party ceases to exist for some reasons, there 
may be a replacement that occupies the niche held by the failing party.25 Therefore, to 
speak of a party system, at least two parties must exist. 
Likewise, the extent to which a party system is institutionalized makes a big 
difference in the functioning of democratic politics. Where the party system is more 
institutionalized, parties are key actors that structure the political life, shaping the 
electoral process and determining who governs. It means that party organizations are not 
simply expressions of the political desires of charismatic leaders. 
Parties in an institutionalized system have strong roots in society and strong 
identities, which ensures them a significant and fairly stable share of votes stable from 
one election to the next. In other words, normally there is no electoral surprise, making 
the victory of political outsiders a rarity. On the contrary, when the party system is less 
institutionalized, the probabilities of political surprises are higher. As Scott Mainwaring 
and Timothy R. Scully point out, "where it [a party system] is less institutionalized, 
parties are not so dominant, they do not structure the political process as much, and 
politics tend to be less institutionalized and therefore unpredictable. "26 
B. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN VENEZUELA 
To analyze how the institutionalization of the Venezuelan party system ensured 
the political predominance of AD and CO PEl in ruling the country, this section is divided 
25 Peters, p. 115. 
26 Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Timothy R., eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party System in Latin 
America, (Stanford, Ca, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 22. 
. 12 
in three subsections. The first subsection will show the emergence of the traditional 
parties in Venezuela as an initial stage for the establishment of a limited party system 
(1936-1958). The second subsection will show the birth of a limited multiparty system, 
where a pacted democratic transition ensured predominance for AD and COPE! above 
other political organizations (1958-1973). The third subsection will show how AD and 
COPE! actions institutionalized the two-party system, transforming it in a "partyarchy" 
(1973-1988). 
1. Formation of the Party System (1936-1958) 
The modern Venezuelan party system starts with the end of the Juan Vicente 
Gomez dictatorship in 1935. The Gomez regime was consolidated around the goal of 
eliminating all forms of political opposition, and it brought the extinction of all party 
organizations founded in the nineteenth century.27 As the only group capable of 
articulating some form of opposition during the Gomez era, university students, came to 
constitute the base for the nation's modern political parties. Those of the Generation of 
1928, who participated actively in antigovernment demonstrations and managed to escape 
into exile, were later to become the nation's principal leaders. There were the cases of 
Romulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Raul Leoni. 28 
Thus, the decade after 1935 witnessed both the conception and birth of mass 
political parties in Venezuela. Exiles returned to participate actively in the new political 
27 Rey, Juan Carlos, "La Democracia Venezolana y la Crisis del Sistema Populista de Conciliaci6n," 
Revista de £studios Politicos, v. 74, 1991, p.p. 533-578. 
28 Library of U.S. Congress, Venezuela: A Country Study, (Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, 
1993), p. 14. . 
13 
life by expanding politics and opposition beyond student protest or military uprisings. 
AD, calling itself the party of the people, acted underground to represent the interest of 
the dispossessed. It was not until 1941 that Isaias Medina Angarita, beginning a gradual 
liberalization, eased union and political organizations, which evolved in their legalization. 
For Acci6n Democratica (AD), the latter came in September 1941. 
In 1945, this political opening engendered the first attempt to establish a 
democratic system when universal and direct elections were held for the first time in 
Venezuelan political history. This attempt known in Venezuela as the trienio, or three 
years, began with the fall of Medina Angarita in October of 1945 to the overthrow of 
President R6mulo Gallegos by a military coup in 1948. 
During the trienio, Venezuela had a one-party-dominant system, with AD as the 
majority party.29 It was a multiclass party and thereby obtained a broad base of support. 
AD also set up trade unions and other social organizations, which were subordinate to the 
direction of the party. 30 The party itself was vertically integrated, with powerful links 
"binding block and neighborhood to regional and national structure,"31 especially in the 
geographically and socially marginal communities. Links to the party provided welcome 
sources of orientation, legitimacy, and solidarity, as well as channels for redressing 
population needs and peasant organization's clamors. 
29 Sartori, Giovanni, Parties and Party System, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.p. 192-201 
3° Coppedge, p. 28. 
31 Kornblith, Miriam and Levine, Daniel H., "Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System," in 
Scott Mainwaring, and Timothy R. Scully, eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party System in Latin 
America, (Stanford, Ca, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 22. 
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This situation ensured AD's success in the three elections held during the trienio, 
permitting it to consolidate its predominant position. To illustrate, for the National 
Constituent Assembly (1946), presidential and Congressional (1947), and Municipal 
Councils ( 1948) elections AD got 78, 74, and 70 percent of the votes respectively. 32 
The second major party, COPE!, founded in 1946, was tied to the conservative 
sectors of society with links to the Catholic church, because to that its electoral support 
came from the Andean region, an area characterized for its conservatism and religiosity. 33 
Taking into account that the concentration of population, wealth, and power in the Andes 
still had enormous influence in the Venezuela political life after Gomecismo, the 
COPEI's possibility of challenging AD were not insignificant. However, these religious 
and regional cleavages did not reach the same in-depth levels within the populace as AD 
did because the latter encouraged identification by the poor with its cause by using 
governmental control of oil revenues to benefit them. 34 
A third party, Union Republicana Democratica, or URD (Democratic Republican 
Union), competed without great success for the same ideological space as AD during the 
trienio.35 However, URD's ambiguous position on political issues and limited 
organizational success weakened its competitive position in relation to AD. 
32 Molina, Jose E. and Perez, Carmen, "Evolution of the Party System in Venezuela, 1946-1993," Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 7.1, 1996, p. 169. 
33 Levine, Daniel, H., Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela, Princeton University Press, 1973, p.p. 
32-41. 
34 Baloyra, Enrique and Martz, John D., Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political 
Opinion, University of Texas Press, 1979, p.p. 46-109 
35 Lopez, Margarita, "Las Elecciones de 1946 y 1947," Bolet[n de Ia Academia Nacional de Historia, v. 
70, (April-June1987), p. 449. 
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fu all, AD swept the political arena, also pushing rivals into a marginal status. The 
Partido Comunista Venezolano, or PCV (the Venezuelan Communist Party) that had 
achieved an important level of support of the working class, also suffered the 
consequence of the strong influence of AD within the population. fu addition, PCV's ties 
to international communism forced it to take positions that damaged its viability.36 
While AD was fortifying its popular support, however, the political situation in 
general became unstable, and Venezuela's democratic system suffered its first crisis of 
governability in 1948. The political parties' lack of consensus, or its desire to achieve it, 
helped create the climate of instability that was used as an excuse for the military to 
overthrow the democratic regime. 
With the military coup that deposed President Gallegos in November 1948, AD 
and the PCV were outlawed and their leaders persecuted, jailed, or exiled. Seguridad 
Nacional, or SN (National Security), a large secret police, pursued opponents and ran 
concentration camp. AD maintained an underground structure throughout the 
dictatorship. It supported clandestine networks and made several frustrated attempts to 
assassinate the infamous dictator. Although they opposed the dictatorship, COPEI and 
URD continued to function openly at first, albeit under strict surveillance. 
Thus, the dictatorship ofMarcos Perez Jimenez (1948-1958) was a harsh period in 
which the parties matured ideologically and the party elites assimilated the lessons of the 
trienio. The underground organization and the political persecution had two important 
effects. First, the parties agreed that reestablishing democracy was their common 
objective, and they created cooperative connections among leaders and followers that 
36 Komblith and Levine, p. 48. 16 
eased ideological confrontations. Second, the process of social mobilization that had 
started in the 1940s with the emergence of political parties progressively intensified 
during the dictatorship. The Junta Patri6tica (Patriotic Junta), an underground 
movement, fostered strong ties between parties and society with the purpose of 
overthrowing the dictatorship.37 As proof, in January 1957, the Patriotic Junta convoked a 
massive demonstration of civilian opposition in downtown Caracas and also a general 
strike that proved immediately effective. In December 1957, the Patriotic Junta 
encouraged public outrage over the fraudulent plebiscite, which helped to unify and 
stimulate more opposition including intramilitary support. This plebiscite, a popular 
consult aimed to make the dictatorship legitimate, had been a maneuver planned by Perez 
Jimenez to perpetuate him in power. This event would encourage several waves of 
demonstrations, street fighting and military uprisings, which definitively caused the 
collapse of the dictatorship. Perez Jimenez fled the country on January 23, 1958 under a 
tumultuous political and social environment. 
2. A Limited Multiparty System (1958-1968) 
With the return of democracy in 1958, Venezuela's party system took the form of 
a limited pluralism. The three parties created before the dictatorship competed with new 
political movements. During this period, AD and CO PEl· would hold a sort of shared 
hegemony where URD progressively saw a decrease in its political leverage. Although 
URD got 31 percent in the 1958 election (COPEI got just 15 percent), its share ofvotes 
declined to 18 percent in 1963, and 12 percent in 1968. In fact, during the three elections 
37 Library of U.S. Congress, p.p. 22-23. 
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that were held during this period, AD won in 1958 and 1963, led by Presidents R6mulo 
Betancourt and Raul Leoni, respectively, and in 1968, the principal leader of COPEI, 
Rafael Caldera, won by a narrow margin (7 percent). 
Since the beginning of this period, the main political and social organizations 
formed several social pacts with the objectives of consolidating democracy, establishing 
guidelines for elite conciliation, and managing consensus.38 The best-known example of 
this new political arrangement is the Pact of Punto Fijo, signed by the major non-
Communist parties, AD, COPEI, and URD in 1958, in which they agreed on a common 
democratic program to be followed by whichever won the elections that December. On 
the other hand, on the way to an institutionalization of a party system, political parties 
encouraged voter participation, making it practically universal. While laws made voting 
compulsory, the parties' ability to mobilize voters brought participation rates to 92 
percent in 1958, 91 percent in 1963, and 94 percent in 1968.39 
They also agreed to form a coalition to support the government, no matter which 
of the three parties won. The use of a coalition, led by AD for ten years, strengthened 
political action, which kept the opposition away from both right and left. The military, in 
the right, was controlled through successful purges in the officer corps and by means of 
political strategies to enhance civilian control over military. "Divide and conquer" was 
the most common of these strategies by increasing decentralization of the nature of 
command within the armed forces. The Ministry of the Defense was no longer dominant 
in budgetary, legal and military authority when its monopolist responsibilities were 
38 Borges, Welkis and Pereira, Valia, "Regularidad y Crisis en la Democracia Venezolana," Estudios de 
Coyuntura, (July-December 1984), v. 8, p. 84. 
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transferred to the services. In addition, the pacted political provisions in the new 
Constitution designated the President as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
40 In 
the case of the left, political consensus marginalized it ideologically by spreading within 
the Venezuelan society anti-Communist feelings generated from abroad. 
The election results of this period testify to the incipient multiparty system. For 
example, although in 1958, AD, COPE! and URD shared 90 percent of the vote, in 1963, 
the independent candidacy of Arturo Uslar Pietri obtained a relatively high percentage of 
the vote (16 percent). In 1968, a new party won a significant portion of the vote. The 
Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, or MEP (Electoral Movement of the Populace), even 
though it resulted from the most significant split in the AD, received 17 percent. Even the 
former dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez got ~ubstantial votes that year, as the Cruzada 
Cfvica Nacionalista (CCN).41 
This competition among three or more parties and coalition governments during 
this period defined the party system as one of limited pluralism. 
42 They were parties that 
had an apparent challenging portion of the presidential votes, which rarely survived two 
electoral periods. As a matter of fact, after 1968, parties receiving a similar proportion of 
votes would be uncommon in the Venezuela politics at least until 1993. 
39 Molina and Perez, p. 171. 
40 Trinkunas, Harold A., Crafting Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Political Conflict, Institutional 
Design and Military Subordination in Emerging Democracies, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 
Stanford, Ca, October, 1998, p. 158. 
41 Komblith and Levine, p.54. 
42 Sartori, p. 179. 
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The political inconsistency of these parties, in contrast to AD and COPE!, 
typically was caused by having weak organization and fragile support bases consisting of 
independent urban voters. In addition, the left, as a significant political representative in 
other countries, such as Cuba, and Chile, disappeared from electoral competition when its 
most extreme sectors staged an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government with 
guerrilla warfare during the 1960s. The remaining parties would contribute to marginalize 
the left by avoiding coalitions with it in the name of preserving and consolidating the 
democratic system. This effect of political marginalization of the socialist left in 
combination with its military defeat marked an ideological change toward the center.43 
In all, this period witnessed the extension and consolidation of partisan loyalties. 
As the democratic system was reestablished, the stability of the regime in power greatly 
depended on its capacity to generate popular support. Together with the growth of 
democratic indoctrination, this backing was won in exchange for material satisfaction, 
which was channeled through the political parties. Moreover, though AD and COPE! had 
previously penetrated the rural zones, now they broadened their reach throughout the 
country. The two parties worked actively to develop affiliations, taking advantage of their 
participation in government to build clientelist networks. Once party loyalties crystallized 
in the cities, anti-party movements and weak parties largely lost their support among 
previously independent voters. 
On the other hand, in spite of the significant oil resources that flowed into 
government hands, many of the public's needs went unfilled. Discontent over government 
43 Alvarez, Angel, Estrategias de Propaganda Electoral, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, 
1994, p. 17. 
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inefficiency and ineffectiveness became a constant theme in Venezuelan politics and a 
continual drain of support from the governing party. However, the discontent was minor 
enough that it resulted in an alternation in power between AD and the COPEI rather than 
a permanent rejection of either party. For example, in 1963, at the end of its first 
presidency, AD's vote share decreased by more than 16 points in parliamentary elections 
as well as presidential voting.44 In the elections of 1968, at the end of its second 
administration, AD's vote percentage continued to drop, which undoubtedly benefited the 
COPEI. Thus, COPEI would become a truly national party with a universal profile like 
that of AD, particularly after 1973 with the advent of the two-party system. COPEI won 
backing from anti-AD sectors, supporters of the old regime, and people disaffected by the 
actions of the AD government. 45 
3. The Consolidation of the Two-Party System or "Partyarchy" (1973-
1988) 
The election of 1973 marks a definitive institutionalization of the Venezuelan 
two-party system. From 1973 to 1988, the system was characterized by the electoral 
dominance of AD and COPEI. The concentration of votes among the potential winners, 
encouraged by single-round presidential voting and simultaneous congressional elections, 
benefited the two major parties, even though the legislative contests were decided by 
proportional representation. 46 
44 Molina and Perez, p. 172. 
45 Herman, Donald, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, University of North Carolina Press, 1980, p. 31. 
46 Shugart, Matthew and Carey, John, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral 
Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 54. . 
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Although competition between parties remained high in later years, political 
fragmentation suddenly disappeared. The share of presidential votes going to other parties 
different from AD or CO PEl dropped from 43 percent in 1968 to 15 percent in 1973. An 
almost insignificant minority presence was maintained by organizations on the left, of 
which the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) was the largest.47 The electoral exclusion 
and political and ideological defeats of the socialists had greatly reduced the left's 
possibility of being an equally strong third political force.48 
Expressed in the words of Michael Coppedge, in Venezuela, after the 1973 
presidential elections, a "partyarchy" was established in which "political parties 
monopolize the formal political process and politicize society along party lines.'>49 For 
this purpose, AD and COPEI would establish strong roots in the society, encourage a 
widespread democracy, establish stable rules and structures, and support a stable party 
interparty competition. 50 
Thus, AD and COPEI represented all groups in society, establishing strong roots 
in the society. The card-carrying membership of both parties was larger (up to 31 percent 
of total voters) than party membership in any other country in Latin America. The non-
members at least were sympathizers, which was demonstrated in the share of votes during 
the presidential and legislative elections held in that period. As proof of that fact, these 
two parties shared about 80 percent of the legislative vote and 90 percent of the 
47 Molina and Perez, p. 173. 
48 Silva Michelena, Jose, and Sonntag, Heinz, El Proceso Electoral de 1978: Su Perspectiva Hist6rica 
£structural, Ateneo de Caracas, 1979, p.p. 43-44. 
49 Coppedge, p. 18. 
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presidential vote, even though dozens of other parties appeared on the ballot.51 The party 
structure reached almost the entire country, where headquarters for both AD and COPEI 
were established in almost every town of the country. Likewise, about 80 percent of the 
peasant federations and 60 percent of the labors union were controlled by leaders from 
AD.s2 
Likewise, this "partyarchy" encouraged a widespread legitimacy within the 
population. Those that were not affiliated with this bipartisan establishment would always 
recognize it as the legitimate instrument for deciding who would rule the country. 
Electoral campaign and elections by itself were never a threatening environment for the 
population. In contrast, they were considered as civic festivals with duration oscillating 
between one and two years. At that time, seeing countless parades, car caravans, and 
open-air meetings, especially in the weeks close to the election date was very common. 
Moreover, AD and COPEI adopted and imposed stable rules and structures, 
which ensured a loyalty and obedience from their members. Militants at all levels of the 
party organization risked expulsion if they disobeyed decisions taken within the 
directorate of the party. As a result, senators and deputies, state legislators, and members 
of municipal councils frequently kept the "party line," which favored AD and COPEI 
absolute control during the processes of decision-making and policymaking. Likewise, 
politicized members of professional associations, student governments, peasant 
federations, state enterprises, and foundations were controlled in the very interest of the 
5° Coppedge,p.l9. 
51 Molina and Perez, p. 173. 
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party. For example, labor leaders abstained from calling strikes when their party was in 
power. 
AD and COPEI stabilized the two-party system by means of consensus and 
consultation. The leaders of both parties made a habit of consulting not only each other, 
but also with leaders of other political and social organizations concerning policy-making 
process or whatever controversial issue arose. For instance, when the policies regarding 
defense, foreign affairs, and oil industry were not the result of consensus, then they were 
at least ·shaped by consultation. In this way, interparty conflicts were kept at a minimum. 
Likewise, the parties built good working relations by using state resources to co-
opt other strategic actors as the military and the private sector. In exchange for not 
intervening in political issues, the AD and COPEI governments rewarded the armed 
forces with high salaries, ambitious educational programs, frequent promotions, and 
expensive equipment. Concerning the private sector, although some associations, such as 
the Federaci6n de Camaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producci6n, or 
FEDECAMARAS, Consejo Nacional de Comercio, or CONSECOMERCIO, and 
Consejo Venezolano de Industria, or CONINDUSTRIA often criticize~ government 
policies, they became highly dependent upon subsidies, low taxes, and protective tariffs. 53 
In this way, AD and COPEI, whoever was ruling, created conditions for a very 
stable govemability for fifteen years. Both parties, by means of an enhanced capacity to 
bargain with other parties and strategic actors, in combination with a large, popular, 
52 McCoy, Jennifer, Democratic Dependent Development and State-Labor Relations in Venezuela, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University ofMinnesota, Ml, 1985, p. 43. 
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tightly discipline, developed a high degree of influence over almost all levels of the 
state. 54 
C. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 
To analyze how a progressive deinstitutionalization of the two-party system 
undermined its capacity to monopolize voter's preference, this section is divided in two 
subsections. The first subsection will show how a progressive deterioration in the two-
party system's effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy fostered a popular backlash to the 
political establishment, endangering the stability of the democratic regime. The second 
subsection shows how the discredited status of the traditional party system encouraged 
political fragmentation and the presidential election of political outsiders. 
1. The Beginning of the Two-Party System's End (1988-1993) 
The ineffectiveness and inefficacy of AD and COPEI governments between 1973 
and 1988, and a growing economic crisis led to the progressive lack of legitimacy of the 
dominant political parties. By 1989, the Venezuelan economy could no longer support the 
high rates of subsidies and the increasing foreign debt burden, particularly in light of the 
nearly 50 percent reduction in the price of oil during 1986.55 This was reflected in levels 
53 Crisp, Brian, "Lessons from Economic Reform in the Venezuelan Democracy," LARR, v. 33, No. 1, 
1998, p. 23. 
54 McCoy, Jennifer and Smith, William, C., "Democratic Disequilibrium in Venezuela," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 37, No.2, (Summer 1995), p. 5. 
55 Karl, Terry L., The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, (Berkley, Ca, University of 
California Press, 1997), p. 38. 
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of electoral participation, which declined from 97 percent in 1973 to 88 percent in 1978, 
87 in 1983 and 82 percent by 1988. 
However, the real breakdown of the party system occurred when Carlos Andres 
Perez tried to reverse this pattern of declining economic performance by implementing 
neoliberal economic policies. Price increases led the public to riot and loot in major urban 
areas. Weak social systems and increases in the costs of living struck the populations 
severely. Socially and economically, Venezuelans saw little fulfilling their expectations, 
despite Venezuela's enormous oil industry potential. Furthermore, to worsen this lack of 
legitimacy both in the eyes of the general population and the military, the armed forces 
were used to control these riots, and approximately one thousand people died. 56 Part of 
the armed forces would never forget that they turned their arms against the population 
while supporting an illegitimate government. In 1992, some military factions would again 
raise their arms, but now against the government by means of two coups d'etat attempts 
in 1992. 
Fortunately for the democratic regime, both military uprisings failed. The pro-
democratic "hierarchical" part of the armed forces-high military command-had preserved 
the regime when they opposed the "non-hierarchical" dissident group of some generals, 
colonels, majors, and lieutenants.57 Later, the effects of the government's lack of 
legitimacy within the Venezuelan society would produce more pacific outcomes. 
56 Linz, Juan J., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 17. 
57 Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London, 1996, p. 5. · 
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President Carlos Andres Perez was replaced by means of unquestionable democratic 
procedures in 1993 (impeachment). 58 
2. The Presidential Victory of Chavez and the End of "Partyarchy" 
(1993-1998) 
The progressive lack of legitimacy of the traditional parties would continue 
having a negative effect on the Venezuelan political system. From a situation of almost 
absolute two-party dominance between 1973 and 1988, the country shifted in 1993 to a 
clearly multiparty electoral panorama. 59 The vote in 1993 was evenly divided among four 
options, constituted by five parties: AD (23 percent), COPEI (23 percent), La Causa 
Radical or LCR (21 percent) and the coalition Convergencia Nacional, or CN and MAS 
(a combined 25 percent). Also, this election was characterized by high levels of 
abstentionism with 60 percent of registered voters, down from 82 percent in 1988. The 
decline in turnout in national elections had already been evident in the state and local 
elections of 1989 and 1992.60 
New elections in December 1993, for president, Congress, and state assemblies, 
resulted in the election of Rafael Caldera, a former president and founder of COPEI. 
However, this did not imply a return to the status quo of two-party system. Caldera, who 
had broke with his party, ran as an independent, supported by a political coalition formed 
by MAS, Convergencia Nacional, or CN, and a group of 16 smaller parties. Campaigning 
58 Loveman, Brian and Davies, Thomas M., Jr., Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Third Edition, Scholarly 
Resources Inc., Wilmington, DE, 1997, p. 227. 
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Cuestiones Politicas, v. 13, 1994, p.p. 63-90. 
60 Molina and Perez, I 996, p. I 74. 
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on at platform of anti-corruption, anti-poverty, and a revision of the neoliberal reforms, 
Caldera attempted to create within the populace an image of independent from the Punta 
Fijo system. 
Thus, the 1993 elections confirmed the progressive popular backlash toward a 
two-party dominant system, as the votes for AD and COPEI together lost indisputable · 
primacy in past periods. Both parties, which had accounted for 75 percent of the vote in 
congressional elections from 1973 through to 1988, found themselves sharing a total of 
no more than 55 percent in 1993. Moreover, the two traditional parties having shared 85 
percent of the presidential vote between 1973 and 1988 won only 47 percent in 1993. 
Likewise, the introduction of uninominal congressional districts for 1993-a system by 
which candidates ran on their own name, rather than as a head of a party-combined with 
the antiestablishment protest vote, had produced a Congress composed of four dominant 
political forces instead the traditional AD-COPEI domination.61 
On the other hand, the high degree of political fragmentation, in addition to a 
widespread rejection of the old establishment, encouraged the emergence of political 
outsiders in form of organizations or individuals.62 The anti-establishment groups Patria 
Para Todos or PPT and the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 or MBR200 
were examples of this situation. Both movements once transformed in legal political 
parties would become the political platform of Hugo Chavez Frfas, a former lieutenant 
colonel, who had led the abortive coup of February, 41h 1992. 
61 Molina and Perez, 1996, p. 175. 
62 Sartori, p. 132. 
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Caldera's first year and a half in office was spent in crisis management, trying to 
reconcile the promises of social equity with the constraints imposed by scarce resources. 
However, contrary to what the populace expected, his administration was marked by 
ambiguity and contradictions, on both political and economic issues. As proof, the 
banking system collapsed, poverty rates grew to over 50 percent, inflation hovered 30 
percent, while oil prices plunged. This situation boosted the populace's previous negative 
reactions toward traditionally strong parties. In a poll taken in August 1993, two thirds of 
1 ,500 respondents took an unfavorable view of the AD while half disapproved of the 
CO PEl. The political parties were seen as the most corrupt of all national institutions. 63 
In another poll taken the same year, although the populace remained faithful to 
democracy, trust in political institutions fell to very low levels. From a sample of 1,500, 
respondents declared much or some confidence in political institutions as follows: the 
judiciary (34 percent), Congress (30 percent), the executive (29 percent), and political 
parties (31 percent). In contrast, confidence was high for the Catholic church (71 percent), 
universities (65 percent), and the army (53 percent). When asked who was to blame for 
the crisis, the answers were politicians (89 percent), democracy (1 percent), both (9 
percent), or neither (1 percent).64 
In another national survey, also with a sample of 1,500, conducted in the 
beginning of the following year, respondents were asked, "In view of the last 35 years of-
democracy, are you very happy with this system, somewhat happy, or should it be 
replaced by another system?" The answers were very happy (16 percent), somewhat 
63 McCoy and Smith, p.p. 139-140. 
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happy (61 percent), it should be replaced by another system (23 percent). Of the last, 33 
percent stated that they would replace the current democracy with a better democracy. 65 
These response levels accord with findings from other surveys that have asked similar 
questions.66 By July 1994, it was not surprising that some 29 percent of Venezuelans 
justified the military uprising by Hugo Chavez, already released and pardoned by Caldera. 
Thus, since Chavez was never convicted, he took advantage of both his increasing 
popularity, and the already weakened Venezuelan party system to participate in the 1998 
electoral process. Chavez built an impressive political campaign to discredit what was left 
of the puntofijismo. Through his party, the Movimiento Quinta Republica, or MVR (Fifth 
Republic Movement), Chavez promised to carry out revolutionary changes by eradicating 
the traditional political parties, writing a new constitution, and addressing the need for the 
poor. 
In this setting of the public's widespread disillusionment with the two traditional 
parties, Chavez benefited the most of all the candidates. Chavez's popular support 
dramatically increased from an initial 6 percent in June 1998 to 39 percent of the voters 
polled by August 1998, just three months before the elections.67 
Furthermore, Chavez was helped by the maneuverings of the traditional parties 
during the campaign, which contributed to undermining the attractiveness of other 
64 Molina and Perez, p. 176. 
65 Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, and Instituto de Estudios Polfticos, Encuesta 
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"outsider" candidates. Realizing that they were no longer attractive to the electorate, AD 
and CO PEl started "to be a winner" by backing non-partisan candidates with high popular 
support. For example, the 1998 campaign began with the former Miss Universe, Irene 
Saez Conde, and the later dissident AD leader Claudio Fermin leading the pack.68 COPEI, 
seeing in Saez a potential winner with a strength of 40 percent in the polls, endorsed her. 
But unfortunately, once the electorate realized that Saez's support was provided by a 
puntofzjista party, her popularity declined. On the other hand, although Fermin unlinked 
himself from a traditional party, his popularity began to decline because voters still 
associated him with the old establishment. AD, without having a candidate with electoral 
attractiveness, provisionally appointed its president, Jose Alfaro Ucero, in order to avoid 
an internal split. Later, as a desperate move, the AD would disregard him by offering 
support to Henrique Salas Romer, a popular Yale-educated former governor of Carabobo 
state, who had accumulated 21 percent in the polls. So did COPEI. However, Salas 
Romer, realizing how discredited both parties were, stepped back. 
By November 1998, the polls confirmed that the presidential contest was a two-
way race between Chavez, who was 6 to 12 percent ahead in the lead, and Salas Romer, 
with a steady 3 8 percent. The traditional parties' candidates, suffering from weak public 
support, were trailing far behind ~th only 3 to 7 percent. Surprisingly or not, Chavez 
won the election with a significant majority. As Jennifer McCoy points out: 
The Venezuelan people had voted, peacefully but definitively, for 
change. The final tally showed that Chavez had won by more than a 
68 McCoy, Jennifer "Chavez and the End of 'Partyarchy' in Venezuela," Journal of Democracy, v. 10.3, 
1999, p. 66. 
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million votes over his nearest rival, carrying 20 of 23 states, and winning 
56 percent of the vote (Salas Romer finished with 40 percent).69 
For the Venezuelan political history that meant the end of a long-standing two-
party hegemony since the Pact ofPunto Fijo. AD and CO PEl together, having dominantly 
received impressive figures in past presidential elections (93 percent in 1988), received 
just 11 percent of the presidential votes in 1998. 
69 Ibid. 
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III. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF HUGO CHAVEZ FRIAS' 
PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY 
The institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of any party system is closely 
linked to the parties' ability to govern effectively, particularly in the economic sphere. In 
Venezuela, during the last four decades, the availability of significant oil had ensured a 
solid govemability for democratically elected candidates of the AD and the CO PEl. This 
contributed to the institutionalization of a party system. Likewise, the pacted nature of the 
Venezuelan democratic transition had facilitated the unanimously political adoption of a 
model of economic development characterized by increasing social spending while 
subsidizing and protecting local industry. 
However, the civilian uprisings of February 1989 and the two military coup 
attempts of 1992 were unequivocal signs that something was wrong. The same political 
class that Venezuelans had once trusted to lead the country along a path of economic and 
social equity, did exactly the opposite. The Venezuelan leadership's increasing inability 
to address economic and . social populace's needs coupled with high levels of 
mismanagement, corruption, and patrimonialism progressively undermined legitimacy of 
the democratic regime. As a result, there were several outcomes related to popular 
rejection toward traditional parties·, ranging from increasing levels of electoral abstention 
to unusual voter support to political outsiders. In fact, Hugo Chavez, a political novice, 
would eventually win the presidential elections in 1998. 
To demonstrate why the poor economic performance contributed to the 
deinstitutionalization of the party system and opened the "window of political 
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opportunity" for outsiders, this chapter is divided in three sections. The first will show 
how parties could initially use state resources to solidify their ties to the population and 
their hold on power. Also, it will show how, over time, the adoption of a rentier model for 
economic development would encourage state intervention by using oil rents to subsidize 
non-oil activities rather than to adopt genuine policies of development. 
The second section will focus on the oil booms of the 1970s and 1980s. By 
analyzing both booms, it will show how the political class mismanaged enormous oil 
revenues with mistaken economic policies while creating the illusion of economic 
development. To illustrate, although the state took in $240 billion (U.S.) in oil revenues 
between 1974 and 1999, the poverty level rose from 33 percent to 70 percent in the same 
period.70 This situation, in combination with widespread pernicious corruption and . 
patrimonialism within the political elite, would provoke a profound backlash within the 
populace, and a generalized social discontent toward traditional parties. 
The third section focuses on Carlos Andres Perez and Rafael Caldera's failed 
efforts to deal with the economic crisis by reducing the government role in the economy 
while fostering market-oriented reforms. This section argues that CAP was unable to 
address the crisis because of the very institutionalization of the party system. The strong 
parties and their allies in labor and manufacturing blocked reforms when they attacked 
their privileges. In the case of Caldera, this section argues that although political promises 
were made to reverse the economic stalemate, the retake of an economic model that relied 
on oil rents frustrated Venezuelan's expectations that its social and economic needs were 
70 Miller, Juan A., "La Pobreza del Estado Petrolero," El Universal, Opinion, 02/22/00. 
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fulfilled. The unaddressed economic crisis and the inability of leaders to carry out reforms 
would undermine the support for traditional parties. 
A. ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEM 
Period 1958-1973 
In 1958, Acci6n Democratica or AD (the Social Democratic Party), the Comite de 
Organizaci6n Politica Electoral Independiente or COPEI (the Social Christian Party), 
and the Union Republicana Democratica or URD (the Democratic Republican Union), 
established the Pact of Punto Fijo.11 These three principal political parties agreed to 
support oil led-development, increase social spending, protect and subsidize the local 
industry and enlarge the state's jurisdiction in matters of production and social welfare.72 
In another pact written during the weeks before the 1958 elections, known as the 
"Declaration of Principles and Governing Program," AD, COPE!, and the URD agreed on 
more specific matters regarding the economy. In what amounted to guarantees to the 
foreign and local business communities, the parties agreed to respect the principles of 
capital accumulation and the sanctity of private property. Local industry, furthermore, 
was guaranteed government measures to protect it from foreign competition as well as 
subsidies through the state-run Corporaci6n Venezolana de Fomento, or CVF 
71 McCoy, Jennifer and Smith, William C., "Democratic Disequilibrium in Venezuela," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v. 37, No 2, (Junel995), p. 113. 
72 Karl, Terry L., The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, (Berkeley, Ca, University of 
California Press, 1997), p. 99. 
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(Venezuelan Development Corporation.) With respect to agrarian properties, any 
expropriation or transfer of title would provide for compensation to the original owner.73 
Having inherited an empty treasury and enormous unpaid foreign debts from the 
Perez dictatorship, Betancourt nevertheless tried from the beginning to return the state to 
fiscal solvency. He also managed to continue the effort, begun during the 1930s by 
President Isaias Medina Angarita of "sowing the oil" by initiating a variety of reform 
programs, the most important of which was agrarian reform. Land reform was aimed not 
only at addressing peasant's social complaints, but also to reversing Venezuela's 
prolonged decline in agricultural production. Ultimately, however, this reform was 
ineffective because it distributed only unproductive private properties and public lands of 
any size, even large estates, which never reached optimal points ofproduction.74 
On the other hand, due to the persistence of rock -bottom petroleum prices 
throughout his presidency, Betancourt started to borrow significantly at home and abroad 
in order to finance ambitious development projects.75 However, instead of fostering 
economic policies to incorporate the populace in the development process, he just 
subsidized welfare projects to compensate the poor for deficits in such areas as food, 
housing and health care.76 Paradoxically, the peasantry, the poorest sector of the 
population, was the less favored of these social projects, which were mostly concentrated 
73 Hellinger, Daniel, "Democracy Over a Barrel: History through the Prism of Oil," NACLA Report on the 
Americas, v. 27, No.5, p.p. 35-42. 
74 Library of U.S Congress, p. 24. 
75 Ewell, Judith, Venezuela: A Century of Change, (Stanford, Ca, Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 
181. 
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in major cities. For this reason, land workers, looking for better conditions of life, 
. dh . . h b 77 mcrease t e rrugratlon tot e ur an areas. 
Economic growth averaged a healthy 5.5 percent annually during Raul Leoni 
administration (1964-1969), aided by a recovery in petroleum prices and the relative 
political tranquility. Leoni kept the Betancourt reform programs on course and also 
introduced a number of impressive infrastructure projects designed to open up the 
nation's interior to agricultural and industrial development. Some regional integration 
efforts advanced, although Venezuela remained outside the newly-created Andean 
Common Market (ANCOM) in response to objections from the local business 
community, which feared competition from lower-priced goods manufactured in 
neighboring countries.78 The economic advantages and benefits for participating in the 
foreign market still had to wait. 
In 1969, the major concerns of the just-inaugurated Rafael Caldera were not 
unlike those of his two predecessors. He concentrated efforts on agrarian reform and 
increased farm production, the improvement of educational and social welfare benefits, 
the expansion and diversification of industrial development, and progress toward local 
control of the petroleum industry. 
On the other hand, in order to reverse mistaken foreign policies in the economic 
arena, President Caldera led Venezuela to entry into ANCOM upon signing the 1973 
76 Gillis, Malcom, and others, Economics of Development, (New York, N.Y., W.W. Norton & Company, 
1996), p. 94. 
77 Lombardi, John V., Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream of Progress, Oxford University 
Press, 1982, p. 236. 
78 Library of U.S. Congress, p. 34. 
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Consensus of Lima. By joining ANCOM, Venezuela emphasized the importance of 
foreign investment not only in the Caribbean area, but also in Central and South 
America.79 
However, even though Caldera increased the tax rate on the petroleum companies 
(from 50 to 70 percent by 1971),80 these additional funds were used for subsidies to 
bolster support for his government and his party instead of activities for developing the 
economy of the country. 
Thus, Venezuela would not be able to reach the third phase of import-substitution 
industrialization, where the growth and diversification of agriculture must accompany the 
development of the industry.81 On the contrary, the agricultural sector was neither capable 
of supplying the domestic market, nor developing enough to produce for export, 
remaining technologically and socially backward. 
On the other hand, as a result of a pernicious relation between the economic and 
political elites, the wealthy groups, either foreign or domestic, were unfairly favored in 
economic participation and competition, which exaggerated strong tendencies toward 
foreign penetration and oligopoly. This pattern, characterized by awarding a privileged 
economic class with selected import licenses, tariff, and credits, barred the participation 
of new entrants into a sector, limiting the number of firms receiving protection and 
thereby contributing to the maintenance of economic concentration. 82 
79 Library of U.S. Congress, p. 35. 
80 Hellinger, p. 40. 
81 Alexander, Robert J., "The Import Substitution Strategy of Economic Development," Journal of 
Economic Issues, v. I, (December 1967), p.p. 124-125. 
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As seen so far, the lack of coherent economic policies, as well as the 
patrimonialist and protectionist governing of Venezuela, stopped any real economic 
development during this period. Petroleum exploitation encouraged a national consensus 
on state intervention through the emergence of a capital-intensive and anti-agrarian 
economic model based on the distribution of oil revenues to subsidize non-oil activities 
rather than to establish suitable policies of development. 
This economic panorama eroded Venezuelans' hope to see a real economic 
awakening, which could have fulfilled their expectations. On the contrary, the 
policymakers just converted Venezuela into a highly oil-dependent country.83 
B. THE OIL BOOMS OR ''EASY COME, EASY GO" 
As Terry Lynn Karl points out, there is a paradox among oil-rich countries. 
Having the exceptional opportunity of managing large amount of revenues in a productive 
way, governments tend to use the "easy-money" only to create illusions of development.
84 
Venezuela is not the exception. Despite experiencing favorable external condition (two 
oil booms) boosted by sudden increases of international oil prices, Venezuela never 
reached the level of an industrialized country. Venezuelans would never forget this fact, 
which eventually caused profound disenchantment against the political class. During the 
1970s and 1980s, growing segments of the population started to feel the effect of 
misguided economic policies and began to tum away from the political system. For the 
8' 
-Karl, p. 163. 
83 Karl, p.73. 
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large segments of the public amidst plentiful government spending and apparent 
economic health fueled by the oil booms of the 1970s and 1980s. Irresponsible spending 
during this period, however, caused · the economic crisis that destroyed the 
institutionalized party system in the 1990s. 
1. 1973 Oil Boom 
By means of a brilliantly orchestrated campaign, Carlos Andres Perez captured the 
attention of the voters, who saw him as a vigorous and eager candidate unmatched by any 
Venezuelan politician. His famous slogan Democracia con Energfa (Democracy with 
Energy) highly impacted the populace, especially in the unpaved barrios.85 However, in 
addition to the collective satisfaction with the results of the 1973 election, Venezuela had 
still another reason to be euphoric at the dawn of 1974. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War had triggered a quadrupling of crude oil prices in a period of only two months, 
representing an increase in the price of a barrel of oil from $2 to $10.90 (more than 419 
percent). Of course, this favorable economic situation brought new aspirations of 
prosperity, national greatness, equity and autonomy.86 But in reality, this surplus 
exacerbated "all sorts of illusions and expectations that proved to be the basis for many 
policy mistakes."87 Thus, when Carlos Andres Perez assumed the presidency in February 
84 Karl, xiv. 
85 Karl, p. 116. 
86 Karl, p. 3 
87 Nairn, Moises, "Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform," Journal of Democracy, v. 5, (October 
1994), p. 42. 
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1974, he was immediately faced with the seemingly enviable task of managing a windfall 
of unprecedented proportions. 
Through an ambitious economic plan called La Gran Venezuela (The Great 
Venezuela), Perez started to deal with poverty through price controls, income increases, 
employment creation, and social services. The government founded a number of state-
owned enterprises and invested in major infrastructure. It also nationalized basic 
industries, especially petrochemicals, aluminum, and steel. 
All of these attempts were applied with the firm purpose of boosting the economy. 
But at that time, the "Dutch Disease"-the decline in profitability of traded goods 
stemming from an overvalued exchange rate created by oil booms-had already caused 
severe problems for the rest of the economy related to the foreign exchange inflow and its 
possible negative effects.88 As Jennifer McCoy and William C. Smith argue: 
Sharp price shocks plus the subsequent massive inflow of foreign 
exchange led to a significant appreciation of the (already overvalued) 
local currency came (sic) together to exert a drastic impact on different 
sectors of production .... Despite the president's pledge of 'sowing 
petroleum' by investing the huge windfall to boost the productivity of 
the rest of the economy, it proved impossible to control the inflow of 
foreign exchange, much less to manage it wisely.89 
By 1974, President Perez had put aside his promised intention to "manage 
abundance with the mentality of scarcity," and embarked on a spending spree designed to 
distribute Venezuela's oil wealth among the citizenry. Price controls that subsidized the 
public consumption of food and other commodities were introduced. Ruling by decree, 
88 Looney, Robert E., "Real or Illusory Growth in an Oil-Based Economy: Government Expenditures and 
Private Sector Investment in Saudi Arabia," World Development, v. 20, No.9, 1992, p. 1367. 
89 McCoy and Smith, p. 126. 
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Perez authorized wage increases that allowed Venezuelan workers to buy goods that they 
otherwise could not have afforded.90 Thus, in combination with foreign exchange controls 
that subsidized imports, the Venezuelan population was able to purchase enormous 
quantities of "Japanese stereos and televisions, German automobiles and cameras and 
clothing, and processed foods from the United States."91 But in reality, the rent 
component of salaries remained fairly steady, despite high government revenues and 
foreign borrowing. 92 Likewise, government subsidies assumed a variety of other forms as 
well. For example in 1974, $350 million (U.S.) in debts owed to state agencies by the 
Venezuelan farming community were simply cancelled. 
The Perez administration initiated various other populist programs to spur 
employment. The 1974 Law of Unjustified Dismissals made it quite difficult for 
employers to fire workers and mandated ample severance payments to those who did lose 
their jobs. Public employment doubled in five years, reaching 750,000 by 1978. Although 
unemployment levels dropped precipitously, Venezuelans' traditional contempt for hard 
work increased, leaving many necessary jobs either unfilled or filled by a growing 
number of undocumented or illegal immigrants from Colombia and Brazil.93 
Even though these subsidy and employment programs theoretically sought to 
improve the lot of the poor, in fact, the actual outcome was that a significant portion of 
the population continued to live in a state of misery. Income distribution was less 
90 Baptista, Asdrubal, "Gasto Econ6mico, Ingreso Petrolero y Distribuci6n del lngreso: Una Nota 
Adicional," Trimestre Econo6mico, v. 52, No. 1 (Jan-Mar 1988), p. 232. 
91 Library of U.S. Congress, p. 32. 
92 Baptista, Asdrubal, and Mommer, Bernard, "Renta Petrolera y Distribuci6n Factorial del lngreso," in 
Hans-Peter Nissen and Bernard Mommer, eds. Adios ala Bonanza? Caracas, 1989, p.p. 25-27. 
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equitable in 1976 than it had been in 1960, and one study found that fully 40 percent of 
the population nationwide were ill-fed and undernourished. This contrast of widespread 
poverty amidst urban development and the conspicuous consumption of the middle and 
upper classes was particularly damaging to Perez, who had been elected with a public 
image as a "friend of the people."94 
At this point, the rentier economic model associated with an explicit state 
interventionism had taken full dimension. As Steve Ellner explains: 
... the [Venezuelan] rentier framework depicts a paternalistic state that 
funnels oil money into a multiplicity of sectors to alleviate social tension 
and political conflict, but without establishing criteria of any sort ... the 
[Venezuelan] rentier state subsidizes diverse industries with oil rent 
money in such a way that the price of goods does not reflect their true 
value ... the [Venezuelan] state has appropriated oil rent in its totality, a 
windfall utilized less for social programs than to keep local currency 
overvalued and avoid rigorous tax collection .... 95 
The government continued, as it had been doing for nearly four decades, to put a 
large portion of its petroleum revenues into building an industrial base, with the objective 
of generating future income after the nation's oil reserves had been depleted. With 
massive amounts of money to spend, emphasis was now placed on large-scale, high-
technology infrastructure and industrial development projects. Thus, by way of special 
powers granted by Congress, Perez channeled the petrodollar flood into the grandiose 
Fifth National Plan-conceived during the mid-1970s and scheduled to become operative 
in 1977, which called for some $52.5 billion (U.S.) in investments over a five-year· 
93 Library of the U.S. Congress, p. 33. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ellner, Steve, "Recent Venezuelan Political Studies: A Return to Third-World Realities," Latin 
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period. The centerpiece of this state-directed program of industrial development was the 
massive industrial complex at Ciudad Guayana. Located near major deposits of iron and 
other raw materials in the vast Guyana highlands, the complex was placed under the 
supervision of the Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana or CVG (Venezuelan 
Corporation of Guyana). Ciudad Guayana was developed during the early 1960s as an 
effort to decentralize industrial development away from Caracas. The government erected 
modern, large-scale aluminum and bauxite refineries and massive hydroelectric projects 
with a vision of converting the Orinoco Basin into a Venezuelan Rhineland.96 
But all of these attempts in expanding social services and supporting the energy 
and metallurgical industries crashed because they were created under the assumption that 
the rising oil prices would boost government revenue throughout the 1970s. Instead, 
Venezuela's oil income leveled off in 1976 and began to decline in 1978 provoking 
serious macroeconomic disequilibria. 97 
Foreign commercial banks, especially U.S banks, awash with petrodollars 
deposited by other OPEC nations, provided loans to make up the shortfall so that 
Venezuela's development programs could proceed on schedule.98 But as a negative result, 
new economic groups and individuals belonging to the privileged circle of the 
"President's Men" took advantages of this "easy money," and accrued vast fortunes, 
96 Ellner, p. 211.. 
97 McCoy and Smith, p. 116. 
98 McCoy, Jennifer, "The Politics of Adjustment: Labor and The Venezuelan Debt Crisis," Journal of 
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frequently based upon real-estate speculation, commissions and massive corruption. Perez 
himself may have become one of the richest men in the hemisphere. 99 
Likewise, the international banks saw oil-rich Venezuela as an excellent credit 
risk while, on the other hand, the autonomy of Venezuela's state firms allowed them to 
borrow excessively, independent of central government accounting. To expedite their 
receipt of this external financing, the autonomous entities opted for mainly short-term 
loans, which carried higher rates of interest. Thus, the Perez administration began to sink 
the money into vast building projects, many of which had been planned by Centro Simon 
Bolivar or CSB (Simon Bolivar Center.) This government housing agency spent an 
estimated $100 million in foreign loans building a controversial and ostentatious high-rise 
apartment and shopping complex in downtown Caracas, called Parque Central (Central 
Park.) This and other wasteful projects contributed to the public-sector foreign debt of 
nearly US$12 billion in 1978, a five-fold increase in only four years. An estimated 70 to 
80 percent of this new debt had been contracted by the decentralized public 
administration. 100 
Between the vast increase in oil revenues before 1976 and the immense foreign 
debt incurred by the government, the Perez administration by both mismanagement and 
corruption spent more money (in absolute terms) in five years than had all other 
governments during the previous 143 years combined. Despite expansive overseas 
programs to train managers of the new public entities, the lack of competent personnel to 
99 Ellner, Steve "A Tolerance Worn Thin: Corruption in the Age of Austerity," NACLA Report on the 
Americas, v. 27, No.3, (Nov-Dec 1993), p.p. 13-16. 
45 
execute the government's many sophisticated endeavors became painfully evident. The 
delays and myriad cost overruns that ensued formed the backdrop of frequent 
malfeasance by public officials. Overpayment of contractors, with kickbacks to the 
contracting officers, was perhaps the most rampant form of graft. Featherbedding and the 
padding of payrolls with nonworking or nonexistent employees also became common 
practices. 101 fu sum, during this period, the government wasted again a great opportunity 
for achieving economic development and created a public debt that would spell ruin in 
the future. 
2. 1980 Oil Boom 
Announcing during his March 1979 inaugural address that Venezuela could not 
continue as a "nation that consumes rivers of whiskey and oil,"102 President Luis Herrera 
Campins promised to assume an austere posture toward government fiscal concerns. 
Public spending, including consumer subsidies, was ordered cut, and interest rates were 
increased to encourage savings. However, when the Iranian Revolution and the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq War caused oil prices to jump from $17 (U.S.) per barrel in 1979 to $28 
(U.S.) in 1980, Herrera abandoned his austerity measures before they had had a chance to 
yield results. 103 
100 Bridges, Tyler, "Down the Toilet: Where Did Venezuela's Loan Money Go?" Washington Monthly, v. 
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Early on in his term of office, President Herrera also pledged to pursue policies 
aimed at reviving the moribund private sector. The first of these measures, however, the 
elimination of price controls, only contributed further to rising inflation. As with his 
commitment to austerity, the president failed to persist in his pledge to business. For 
instance, in October 1979 the administration yielded to political pressures from the AD-
dominated Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela or CTV (Confederation of 
Venezuelan Workers), and approved sizable wage increases. Meanwhile, the number of 
those employed by state-owned enterprises and autonomic agencies, which Herrera had 
promised to streamline and make more efficient, proliferated instead. 
On the other hand, the Herrera administration initiated several projects, such as a 
huge coal and steel complex in the state of Zulia, a new natural gas plant with 1,000 
kilometers of pipeline, a new railroad from Caracas to the coast, and a bridge linking the 
Caribbean Isla de Margarita (Margarita Island) with the mainland. But the administration 
had a deficit of some US$8 . billion between 1979 and 1982, which prevented the 
accomplishment of almost all projects. This caused a lack of confidence in President 
Herrera's economic management by the local business community, which contributed 
significantly to a precipitous decline in the growth of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
from an annual average of 6.1 percent between 1974 and 1978 to a sickly 1.2 percent 
between 1979 and 1983. Unemployment hovered around 20 percent throughout the early 
1980s. 104 
An unexpected softening of oil prices during late 1981 triggered further fiscal 
problems. World demand for oil-on which the Venezuelan government depended for 
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some two-thirds of its revenues-continued to decline as the market became glutted with 
oil from newly-exploited deposits in Mexico and the North Sea. The resumption of large-
scale independent borrowing by the decentralized public administration came amidst 
publicly in the form of aired disagreements among various officials as to the magnitude of 
the foreign debt. Not until 1983 did outside analysts agree on an approximate figure of 
US$32 billion. 105 Compounding growing balance of payments difficulties, rumors of an 
impending monetary devaluation precipitated a wave of private capital flight overseas in 
early 1983. Some US$2 billion left the country during January and February alone 
whereas the Banco Central de Venezuela or BCV (Central Bank of Venezuela) president 
argued with the finance and planning ministers over what measures to adopt to meet the 
growing crisis. At the end of February, the government announced a system of foreign 
exchange controls and a complicated new exchange system, setting the rate at 4.3 bolivars 
to the dollar for the state, allowing it to float for ordinary transactions, and establishing a 
middle rate for purchases of imports that the government deemed critical. Well-connected 
politicians and economic elites laundered money under this system. At the same time, 
price controls were reinstated to control inflation. 106 The annual increase in consumer 
prices, which had hit a peak of 22 percent in 1980, fell to 6 percent for 1983. 107 
Seeking a way out of the dismal economic situation, the Herrera administration 
decided to transfer a greater share of ever-growing government expenses to Petr6leos de 
104 McCoy and Smith, p. 116. 
105 Library of the U.S Congress, p. 35. 
106 Hellinger, p. 39. 
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Venezuela (PDVSA). The Central Bank of Venezuela appropriated some $4.5 billion 
(U.S.) of PDVSA's reserves to pay the foreign debt, thereby throwing the petroleum 
corporation's autonomy to the wind. This permitted the government to build up its 
currency reserves in order to improve Venezuela's image with foreign banks. 108 But, it 
was too late. Falling prices and dwindling hard-currency reserves led to the devaluation of 
the bolivar, which signaled the end of the bonanza. By 1983, annual petroleum-export 
earning fell from their 1981 high of $19.1 billion (U.S.) to $13.1 billion (U.S.), and by 
1988 the debt was consuming half of Venezuela's oil-export earnings. 109 
Once again, the lack of effectiveness in adopting appropriate economic measures 
was the Zeit motif in both cases. Thus, during the oil booms in 1973 and 1980, neither 
Carlos Andres Perez nor Luis Herrera Campins realized the pernicious effects that 
characterizes such phenomena: a petrolization of the state which weakens its capacity, 
leading to economic decline while creating the illusion that the country was going toward 
an economic development. 110 
C. CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND RAFAEL CALDERA ATTEMPTS TO 
ADDRESS THE ECONOMIC STALEMATE OR "SEQUELS ARE NOT 
ALWAYS GOOD" 
At this point of the Vynezuelan history, the economic issue became an 
unaddressable matter not only for the populace, but also for the political leaders. Neither 
108 Karl, Terry, L., "The Venezuelan Petro-State and the Crisis of its Democracy," in Jennifer McCoy, 
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Carlos Andres Perez nor Rafael Caldera, despite having previous presidential experience, 
got close to reversing such a stalemate characterized by a growing unpaid foreign debt 
and an increasing inflation. On the contrary, most markedly in Perez, they only 
exacerbated the accumulated social tension. In his attempt to implement a neoliberal 
package, Perez challenged elements of the institutionalized party system, which in turn 
resulted and undermined any economic reform. First, Perez's own party objected about 
being excluded from the policymaking process in favor of a team of technocrats, and they 
opposed economic reforms. Second, Perez skipped the traditional consultation with 
entrepreneur and labor organizations, which led them to resist reform by adopting 
unpopular and socially destabilizing measures. Thus, the economic policies of Perez 
would provoke urban riots in 1989, and two military uprisings in 1992. Other aspect of 
the institutionalized party system-namely the tradition of consultation with COPEI-
meant that blame for the failed neoliberal policies was also assigned to COPEI. 
In the case of Caldera, both the failed political promise to reverse the economic 
stalemate and the return to the puntofijista economic policy of relying only on petroleum 
revenues deepened popular disenchantment and rejection toward the "old establishment." 
This would provoke a less violent social response, but one very connected to the previous 
outcomes: the presidential victory of a political outsider in 1998, Hugo Chavez, a former 
coup d'etat leader of 1992. 
11° Karl, 1997, p. 18 
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1. Carlos Andres Perez's Second Government and His Neoliberal 
Economic Package 
Prior to Carlos Andres Perez second government, president Jaime Lusinchi ( 1984-
89) attempted to reverse the 1983 economic crisis through successive devaluations of the 
currency, a multi-tier exchange-rate system, greater import protection, increased attention 
to agriculture, and food self-sufficiency, and generous use of producer and consumer 
subsidies. These 1983 reforms stimulated a recovery from the negative growth rates of 
1980-81 and the stagnation of 1982 with sustained modest growth from 1985 to 1988. By 
1989, however, the economy could no longer support the high rates of subsidies and the 
increasing foreign debt burden, particularly in light of the nearly 50 percent reduction of 
the price of oil during 1986. Moreover, the government had been borrowing from external 
sources, which meant by 1986 the Venezuelan foreign debt reached $33 billion. This 
made Venezuela the fourth-largest debtor in Latin America, even though it had the 
highest per capita income of the region. 111 
Under such critical economic circumstances, Venezuelans reelected Carlos 
Andres Perez as president in 1988, hoping that he would return the prosperity of the early 
1970's. His new administration was inaugurated in late January 1989. Much to the 
population's surprise, Perez surrounded himself with a team of technocrats that 
recommended a neoliberal solution to the problem under the premise that these measures 
had proved effective in countries such Argentina and Brazil, in similar conditions of 
macroeconomic imbalances and stagnation. This meant applying the main components of 
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neoliberalism: fiscal adjustment, privatization, deregulating and/or adjusting prices, 
deregulation of the financial sector, trade liberalization, incentives to foreign investments, 
social security reform, and labor market reform. 112 
At this time, it is important to highlight that the tradition of consultation made 
COPEI a "circumstantial accomplice," spreading feelings within the population that this 
"magic economic recipe" was more of what traditional parties customarily offered. 
Having AD and CO PEl alternate in power for almost 25 years, the hopes for an economic 
awakening were promptly vanished. Nevertheless, against all economic and social odds, 
Perez in a radical way launched an economic reform program called El Gran Viraje (The 
Great Turnaround), following recommendations of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This economic program, el paquete (tl:le package) as it was also popularly known, 
comprised among other points, reduction of the public employees and fiscal budget, 
liberalization of prices and free economy, and an increase in the price of gasoline. The 
increase in gas prices immediately forced the increase of public transportation fees. This 
issue became the spark that ignited the social explosion on the morning of 28 February 
1989. 
Thus, violent riots and looting spread across the major cities, and after four days 
Perez called the armed forces to restore public order. 113 Two days later, peace returned to 
Caracas and to twenty more cities. 'fhe cost: between 1,000 and 1 ,200 people killed. 114 
111 Karl, p. 38. 
112 Komblith, Miriam, "Public Sector and Private Sector: New Rules of the Game," in Jennifer Mccoy, 
Andres Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andres Stambouli, eds. Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress, 
(Coral Gables, FL, North-South Center, University of Miami, 1995), p.p. 80-81. 
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In 1990, Venezuela continued to suffer from the debilitating effects of political 
patronage, corruption, and poor economic management. The country's political and 
economic structures often allowed a small elite to benefit at the expense of the masses. As 
a result, Venezuela's income distribution was uneven, and its social indicators were lower 
than the expected level for a country with Venezuela's level of per capita income. Many 
economic institutions were also weak relative to the country's international stature. The 
failure of the rentier model was evident. 115 
Unfortunately for the population, Perez had to continue applying the package. 
Given the bad economic panorama at the beginning of its presidential period, Perez had 
requested to the International Monetary Fund (llvfF) loans to carry out welfare projects 
and also to reactivate the Venezuelan moribund economy. The loans were approved but 
under certain conditions, which demanded accomplishing the fixed goals in the shortest 
term. Promisingly, the economy racked up a growth rate of 9.7 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), giving Venezuela one of the world's fastest growing 
economies. However, this sudden growth was not accompanied by an explicit effort to 
improve the inequitable distribution of wealth and income. In this way, an extremely 
weak delivery system for social services, in tandem with no systematic focus on social 
policies by the government's economic team, worked against the realization of any 
visible improvement in basic services, such as hospital and schools. Moreover, the real 
114 Schuyler, George W., "Perspectives on Venezuelan Democracy," Latin American Perspectives, v. 23, 
(Summer 1996), p. 16. 
115 Kornblith, p.p. 91-92. 
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public investment in other services such as electricity, water supply, garbage collection, 
and telephone either stagnated or declined. 116 
In addition to the first violent response to these economic hardships, two failed 
coup d'etat attempts threatened the democratic regime in 1992. The COMACATE 
movement (derived from the abbreviation of the Venezuelan ranks of junior and middle 
officers; comandante, mayor, capitan, teniente) was composed of officers from the lower 
middle class, who were badly impacted by the severity of this economic package. They 
justified their actions by the on-going economic crisis and increased corruption, blaming 
the politicians for the impoverishment of a country rich in oil and other natural resources. 
But the uprising failed, as the senior officers, very tied to political and economic elites, 
remained loyal to the constitutional authorities. 
At this point, most analysts agree that there were three causes for the failure of the 
Perez's economic reforms. First, although Perez registered some successes in controlling 
momentarily the fiscal and trade deficit and holding inflation to around 30 percent, he 
failed to achieve approval from political parties for his program. Instead, "the highly 
organized political system viewed the neoliberal restructuring program as little more than 
a hostile attack by an isolated executive and his team of tecnicos." 117 
The second cause of Perez's failed reforms was that his neoliberal program never 
generated popular support or confidence. For instance, according to public opinion polls 
in the year that followed the application of this economic package, 73 percent of the 
116 Nairn, Moises, "The Launching of Radical Policy Changes," in JosephS. Tulchin and Gary Bland, eds. 
Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform, Boulder, 1993, p.p. 39-96 
117 McCoy and Smith, p. 118. 
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respondents expressed fears regarding the cost of living and removal of price controls. 
Likewise, 62 percent had little or no confidence that the country would be prosperous in 4 
to 5 years even though that the growth rate was a remarkable 10 percent. 118 
Unlike the cases of Argentina and Peru, where similar economic measures did not 
provoke such social outcomes, the Venezuelan populace was not warned of its painful 
nature. The technocrats, urged by the need to stop the severe economic crisis at that time, 
underestimated negative indicators of the possible social impact. This situation left little 
room for them to advise Perez to soften the package's application and to inform the 
media of the constrictive nature of such economic measures. The outcome of this 
economic plan was quite politically and socially destabilizing. 
The third and the most important reason for Pere' s failure was the very 
institutionalization of the party system that obstructed addressing the crisis. Close ties 
between traditional parties adversely affected social groups because denied the former of 
privileges. The rentier groups like the F ederaci6n de Camaras y Asociaciones de 
Comercio y Producci6n (FEDECAMARAS), representing middle-class professionals, 
and the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), representing workers, were 
directed mostly by the members of the traditional parties AD and COPEI. They had 
access to government decision making via bureaucratic institutions in the decentralized 
public administration, and they used their privileged political position to fortify their 
economic standing. 
Before launching the program, political leaders of both groups were neither 
consulted nor warned of the scope of the economic package. When the program was 
118 Ibid. 55 
implemented, political leaders adopted unpopular actions once they learned that their 
economic interests would be affected. In the case of FEDECAMARAS, the small and 
medium entrepreneurs increased sensitive prices for the population, most notably those 
belonging to the basic basket of goods and transportation. For its part, the CTV incited 
strikes and demonstration, leading to riots when the population knew that the 
transportation fee would double. 119 
In summary, no breakdown occurred despite the debt crises, the recession, 
political corruption, and calls for broad institutional reforms, even two military coup 
attempts in 1992. Indeed, those who had supported the 1992 coup attempts, as a way to 
express dislike toward politicians, continued to profess their commitment to democracy. 
In fact, President Carlos Andres Perez was replaced by unquestionable democratic 
procedures (impeachment) in 1993.120 
On the other hand, accumulated feelings of rejection of what the two-party 
system had represented in terms of mismanagement, corruption, and patrimonialism 
started to affect the traditional electoral preference of the populace. Thus, Rafael Caldera 
already unlinked from the party which he had founded-COPEI-was supported by new 
parties. Voters would see him as a candidate that could reverse this pathetic political and 
economic panorama. As a result, Rafael Caldera was elected for a second time as 
president in December 1993. 
119 
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2. Rafael Caldera's Second Government and His Failed Orthodox 
Economic Plan 
During the administration of President Caldera ( 1994-1998) the stabilization 
programs failed mostly because of an inherited economic disequilibrium coming from the 
previous government. Heavy inflation, an enormous public and private debt in 
combination to a significant fiscal deficit were troubling macroeconomic indexes. 
Although he came into office promising to reverse "The Great Turnaround" of Perez, 
Caldera was immediately faced with a by-product of its accumulated ineffectiveness: a 
major financial crisis. The Banco Latino, the country's second largest bank, crashed with 
other 13 banks. After abandoning proposals for a constitutional amendment that would 
have allowed him to dissolve the congress, Caldera settled for a declaration of a "state of 
economic emergency" that gave him the power to rule by decree until economic stability 
was restored. Thus, Caldera selectively used this extensive executive power to impose 
price and exchange controls, and also suspended constitutional guarantees regarding 
financial activity and property rights, which he justified in the name of social justice and 
solidarity. 121 
But, the Venezuelan economy continued to suffer many economic hardships: 
inflation remained at 70 percent per annum, the non-oil sector was in recession and 
investment was stagnant. As Luis Zambrano Sequin argues, the failures of these measures 
"are due to two main reasons: the stabilization program has been excessively contractive, 
121 McCoy and Smith, p. 118. 
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and the measures taken have been unsuccessful at controlling the inflationary 
pressure."122 
Paradoxically, Caldera had returned to the Punto Fijo tradition in adopting an 
economic model that relies on petroleum rents. As Jennifer McCoy, and William C. 
Smith highlight: 
At present, the Caldera government appears to be returning to the past, 
reviving state intervention in the economy. Under this scenario, the 
government continues to rely on interventionist economic policies in an 
attempt to contain the negative effects of macroeconomic disequilibria, 
to improve the lot of the poor, and restore national pride. By opening the 
petroleum sector to foreign capital, in order to expand petroleum 
production capacity, the government attracts foreign investment to the 
oil and gold sectors, though not to other economic sectors. The economy 
stagnates, government popularity declines, and threat to the social order 
rebound. 123 
Since 1998, the country had been under the worst economic crisis of the last five 
decades. In the first six months of the year $ 3.4 billion left the country. Foreign 
investment decreased to 65 percent of the level of years earlier. Inflation reached 23 
percent in the month of August and the interest rate reached 91 percent. 124 
Likewise, Venezuela faced a crumbling infrastructure, closed hospitals and 
schools. Public teachers and doctors went on strike several times clamoring for a raise in 
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presidential period, 39 percent of 22 million of Venezuelans were living in critical 
poverty, and another 39 percent in moderate poverty. The fiscal deficit in late 1998 was of 
$ 7 billion (U.S.), about the 8 percent of the GDP, while in the beginning of this year it 
was 5 percent of the GDP. 126 As seen, President Caldera was not only unable to restore 
the economy, but also to reverse the conditions that led to the consolidation of a petro-
state. As Jennifer McCoy and William C. Smith point out: 
The [Venezuelan] petro-state's multiple economic role-entrepreneur, 
regulator, employer, and provider of social welfare-gradually lost both 
their coherence and the capacity to generate sustained growth. The 
activist, entrepreneurial state became bloated, inefficient, and incapable 
of providing even the most basic services and personal security. In this 
way, the state's public and private 'political rent-seeking' led eventually 
to inefficiency, corruption, and vulnerability to fluctuating oil 
revenues. 127 
Under this unfavorable economic panorama, Venezuelans continued to look for 
new mechanisms that could reverse the lack of capacity for conflict management and 
collective decision-making along with a consolidated corruption at all levels of the state. 
They rejected traditional political parties and leaders. In the 1998 elections, the two 
traditional parties received only 11 percent of the votes. 
126 EI Universal Digital. "EI Pafs Saudita ya no Existe" 04 December 1998. Available [Online]: 
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IV. THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF HUGO CHAVEZ FRIAS' 
PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY 
Hugo Chavez Frias was able to take advantage of the people's rejection of 
traditional parties and won the presidency in 1998 for two reasons: the notoriety he 
gained for his effort to "save" the country from the politicians in a 1992 coup attempt and 
the willingness of the people to vote for a former military man and coup leader. Both of 
these factors-Hugo Chavez's decision to carry out the coup attempt and the populace's 
acceptance of a military leader as the answer to their problems-can be explained by a 
culture which views the military as saviors of Ia patria. As Loveman argues: 
As in the past, when Latin American Armed Forces participate in 
politics, they will do so in the name of Ia patria. They were convinced 
that when the politicians 'fail to protect their nations' sovereignty and 
transcendental interests, it is the duty of the armed forces to carry out 
their historic and constitutional missions. Despite the 'democratization 
fad' they remain, in the doctrine, in military role, and in the mind of 
many of their fellow citizens, the 'ultimate reservoir of sovereignty' who 
guarantee the historical continuity of the nation. 128 
Thus, this chapter will show how patriotic beliefs, sentiments, feelings, and values 
historically and culturally inherited for the armed forces, contributed to the setting of a 
constant military presence in Venezuela politics. 129 Likewise, it will show that, although 
initially contained by an institutionalized party system, this military culture of 
involvement in politics eventually contributed to Chavez's electoral victory in December 
1998. 
128 Loveman, Brian, "Latin America Civil-Military Relations in the 1990s: The Armed Forces and the 
'Democratization Fad,"' paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, 
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For this purpose, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will 
show the origins of why Venezuela's armed forces participate in the political fate of the 
country, as a result of the cultural heritage of Spanish army during the conquest and the 
Independence wars. It will also show how, in the absence of an institutionalized party 
system, the military continued to act according to this tradition of intervening in politics 
until1958. The second section will address the period during and after the 1958 transition 
to democracy. This section shows how an institutionalized party system contributed to 
military subordination to civilian rule, and also how professionalization, indoctrination, 
and modernization diminished military participation in politics. The third section will 
demonstrate how the vices of the political class (corruption and mismanagement) 
exacerbated dormant anti-political feelings within the armed forces, resulting in the birth 
· of the Ejercito Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 or EBR200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Army 200) and two coups d'etat attempts. This section also shows how notoriety gained 
from the coup attempts and EBR200's, its evolution into a political party, Movimiento 
Quinta Republica, or MVR (Fifth Republic Movement), and the use of Bolivarian 
symbols helped Hugo Chavez win the 1998 presidential elections. 
129 Lichbach, Mark Irving and Zuckerman, Alan S., eds. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.p. 6, 8. 
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A. VENEZUELAN MILITARY CULTURE AND INVOLVEMENT IN 
POLITICS 
1. Independence 
The political history of Latin America countries has been intimately related to the 
evolution of its armed forces. The need for armed forces has resulted from the very 
existence of the state, as Anibal Ulises Laino points out: 
There are sovereignty, territory, life, decisions, plans, resources, etc. to 
preserve, and it is through its military instrument that a state exercises its 
monopoly on legitimate violence to face whatever challenge that might 
threaten its ch~acter as a sovereign political entity. 130 
Venezuela has not been an exception. The cultural heritage obtained from the 
imperial Spanish army experience fighting against the Moors during the conquest and 
reconquest of Iberia, inevitably blended and shaped the Venezuela's military since the 
time of the Independence war. The patriotic army, invested of the same feelings of saviors 
of la patria-the motherland-as its colonizers, fought against the Spanish loyalist army 
compelled by sentiments of being chosen to keep it alive. 131 Over the years, this 
Venezuelan admiration of what Simon Bolfvar, Jose Antonio Paez, Antonio Jose de 
Sucre, and other Independence heroes meant will endure in their minds, 132 as a main 
source of patriotism. 133 
130 Laino, Anfbal Ulises, cited by Brian Lovemap in For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in 
Latin America, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999, xi. 
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fu the aftermath of the nineteenth century fudependence wars, the Venezuelan 
soldiers, believing that they created the nation by liberating it, also insisted on ruling it. 134 
This claim would become the main military justification for participating in the political 
fate of Venezuela. fu addition, the rapid decay of the political process after fudependence 
would contribute to this perspective when the political vacuum was promptly filled by the 
army. fu this case, the diverse attempts of civilians to exert political influence were short-
lived. A republican constitution and the paraphernalia of representative government were 
duly manufactured but never completely effected. Most of the peninsular aristocracy had 
either been killed or driven from the country. The newly-dominant creole oligarchs, the 
mantuanos, were unable, because of their inexperience in the techniques of authority, to 
provide political solutions. Likewise, the generalized perception of the military and most 
of the population was that civilian rule was synonymous with political irresponsibility 
and administrative incompetence. 135 Thus, the emergence of the caudillos, the former 
leaders of the patriotic army, as a political rulers would be the result of a widespread 
necessity for the people, no matter their social status, to find a satisfactory way to solve 
critical problems concerning economic and social stability. 136 On the other hand, the 
winning of independence from Spain made caudillos "national heroes," which 
encouraged people to follow and support them. 
133 Centeno, Miguel A., "Whose Glorious Dead?: Latin American Nationalism and the Limits of History," 
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2. The Caudillos as Venezuela's Political Rulers 
Within the political, social, economic and military turmoil that followed the 
Spanish domination, "The Liberators" (or caudillos,) assumed the role of a political elite. 
In this way, the caudillos were military, political, and social phenomena that gave 
a certain grade of structure to a society that rejected impersonal -institutions, or that 
seemed incapable of disciplining itself enough to develop any. The caudillos took 
advantage of this situation, arbitrarily and indiscriminately, distributing military titles 
among themselves. This contributed to the spread within society of the military claim that 
"only soldiers truly could govern in the interest of national unity, integrity, and well-
being."137 
As Guillermo Moron reports: 
Ten years after the Federal War [1873] the State of Carabobo alone had 
449 generals, 627 colonels, 967 majors, 818 captains, 504 lieutenants, 
and eighty-five second lieutenants-no less than 3,540 commissioned 
officers. The male population over twenty-one years of age was 22,952; 
which means that in the state over fifteen percent of the active men were 
ffi 138 army o 1cers ... 
The parochial character of the caudillos' political performance provoked 
instability. ·In their constant and ambitious struggle for getting the power, caudillos 
undermined unity and well-being. The saddle, more than the presidential chair, would be 
136 Gilmore, Robert L., Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910, (Athens, Ohio, Ohio 
University Press, 1964), p. 14. 
137 Taylor, Philip B., Jr., The Venezuelan 'Golpe de Estado' of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Perez Jimenez, 
(Washington D.C., Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, v. 4, 1968), p. 16. 
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the true foundation of the republic for more than a century. 139 It was not until 1908 that 
the General Juan Vicente Gomez, as the supreme caudillo, consolidated the national state 
by professionalizing the army. 
3. Juan Vicente Gomez and the Unification of the Political and Military 
Powers 
Juan Vicente Gomez, the last caudillo, through what was called La Reforma 
Militar (The Military Reform) transformed the unskilled, almost barbaric montoneras 
into a more homogenous, technical, and modernized military force. The constitution of a 
permanent and professional military force with national range gave to the country a 
credible governmental structure, which it had lacked throughout its history. This incipient 
but effective development of a military organization would help Juan Vicente Gomez 
consolidate the political power under his absolute control. For example, Gomez did not 
hesitate to use the army as the most effective tool for managing the country as his own 
farm. The Army collected taxes and distributed oil revenues for his benefit while 
repressing the populace. Moreover, by dividing Venezuela into military regions, he made 
possible a more effective distribution of economic, and military resources and enhanced 
governmental control in isolated areas. 140 
Within the military, Gomez fomented and strengthened ideological and doctrinary 
unity, thus achieving a reluctant but ensured obedience. Ideologically, Gomez sought to 
139 Dfaz Sanchez, Ramon, Guzman, Elipse de una Ambici6n de Poder, Biblioteca Nacional de Ia 
Academia de Historia, Caracas, 1953, p.p. 187-188. 
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1979,p.p.89,90,97, 166,179. 
66 
identify the military and his rule with the heroic past. El Ejercito Nacional (the National 
Army) was linked to the Ejercito Libertador (Liberator Army) of the nineteenth century 
independence war and historic dates related to the independence period were used to 
commemorate any important activity of Gomez. It garnered loyalty for him within the 
military and the public, while deterring the ambitious intentions of the old regional 
caudillos. 141 
This evolution from caudillism to militarism made the armed forces autonomous 
capable of existing apart from the president of the republic. However,· it did not keep the 
military out of Venezuela's politics. The legacy of General Juan Vicente Gomez 
contributed to this role. No political parties existed, no organizations or institutions could 
approach the armed forces' national constituency or their organizational capacity to take 
charge of national affairs. 142 The Venezuelan armed forces, at the mid-point of its 
modernization and professionalization, was the best integrated of the country's political 
and social structures. fu the absence of organized civilian groups capable of dominating 
and stabilizing the political process, population's recourse to violence reinforced the 
attraction to the armed forces of filling the power vacuum left by the passing of the last 
caudillo. 143 
Thus, in the three decades that followed, there were 23 years of non-democratic 
regimes in Venezuela ( 1935-1958) under military rulers, interrupted only by the 
protodemocratic trienio (1945-1948). In 1940, General Isaias Medina Angarita shifted the 
141 Ziems, p.p. 212-213. 
142 Lombardi, John V., Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream of Progress, Oxford University 
Press, 1982, p. 218. 
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regime toward a dictablanda, 144 conceding certain rights concerning parties, unions and 
private investors to Venezuelan civil society. Acci6n Democratica, or AD, a political 
party founded in 1941, learned how to participate more effectively in politics. Taking 
advantage of an environment of embitterment over slow promotions in the military and 
the continuing seniority of non-professional Gomecistas officers, AD approached the 
youngest military members, captains and majors trained in the Military Academy, to plot 
against the Medina regime. 145 Once they overthrew the president, the new Junta de 
Gobiemo, or provisional governing committee, was formed in 1945. It had only two 
officers among seven members. 146 Given this political opportunity and taking advantage 
of rising oil revenues, AD carried out public policies based on pragmatism, positivism, 
and social liberalism. Political leaders focused on improving "human capital" through 
academic and vocational education, on raising the standards of public health, nutrition 
and sanitation, and on the accelerated construction of housing. The armed forces did not 
oppose the relatively radical political, economic and social reforms in the beginning of 
the trienio, 147 but they started to become concerned with the inefficiency and waste 
manifested through the government's economic and financial mismanagement. 148 
143 Gilmore, p. 121. 
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The military perceived that AD's poor planning, or "trying to do too much too 
soon"149 was endangering the fate of the country. By perceiving that " .. .the extremist 
fraction that controlled said party [AD] began a series of maneuvers intended to dominate 
even the armed forces," 150 military leaders decided to overthrow the Government of 
President R6mulo Gallegos, who had been elected president for a five-year term 
beginning in February 1948. Thus, the armed forces ended the three-year experiment in 
democracy, giving way to a decade of infamous dictatorship starting in 1948. 
Under the leadership of General Marcos Perez Jimenez, political, social, and 
economic issues were mismanaged through military repression combined with bribery, 
fraud, and threat. 151 
By 1957, junior officers had grown tired of the corruption and the power 
monopoly of the ruling generals. This outrage was compounded by an obviously 
fraudulent Perez Jimenez's attempt to relegitimate his government through a referendum. 
Here, for the first time, the feelings of saving the country by finishing this discredited 
military dictatorship emerged from the military institution itself. This widespread 
sentiment split the officer corps. Even the youngest faction of the armed forces felt that 
something had to be done because Ia patria was imperiled. As a result, Venezuelan Air 
Force planes dropped bombs on the capital on January 1, 1958, to signal the start of a 
military insurrection. Later, when the Navy revolted on January 22, a group of army 
149 Burggraaff, p.p. 87-90 
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officers forced Perez to resign. The following day, Venezuela's last dictator fled the 
country, leaving behind a bankrupted country. 152 
B. SEPARATING MILITARY FROM POLITICS: AN INSTITUTIONALIZED 
PARTY SYSTEM TAKES CONTROL 
When the authoritarian regime of Perez Jimenez collapsed on January 23, 1958, 
the political leaders realized that the most important task for ensuring an effective 
democratic transition was reducing the political interference of the military. The pacted 
nature of the Venezuelan democratic transition was characterized by easy and fast 
settlements among the political elites without a major involvement of the armed forces, 
which contributed to a suitable civilian control over military. The youngest military corps, 
rejecting the infamous dictatorship, started to support civilians as leaders of the country. 
President R6mulo Betancourt, inaugurated in 1959, knew that, of all the issues he 
faced, maintaining civilian authority over the armed forces by reducing anti-political 
feelings was the most critical task. The bad experience during the trienio (1945-1948) had 
taught him that little knowledge of the military issues and an exaggerated militaristic 
ideology within the armed forces were incompatible with any democratic process. 
To do so, R6mulo Betancourt adopted a combined political strategy based mostly 
on professionalization and indoct:.rination.153 Concerning the former, by means of the 
increase of material welfare and professional needs, politicians showed the military that 
they were concerned and could deal with military issues. For indoctrinating the military, 
152 Trinkunas. p. 39. 
153 Trinkunas, p. 140. 
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an intensive program was implemented to transform the ideology of the armed forces 
from a pro-authoritarian to a pro-democratic one. Military members were taught that 
absolute civilian control over the military must prevail over the patriotic feelings of 
saving la patria. To illustrate, R6mulo Betancourt visited the most important military 
installations of the country and improved living conditions in the barracks and to impress 
upon the armed forces the government's concern with military professionalization and 
welfare. 154 To increase professionalization, the Betancourt administration expanded 
educational opportunities for military officers, particularly in non-military fields. 
Scholarships for studying in universities at home and abroad became widely available for 
officers. This political strategy helped to break down barriers between the military and 
civilians. 
Concerning·welfare, the administration expanded loan programs for noncoms and 
officers for the purchase of private housing and provided other concrete, visible benefits 
to military personnel. Likewise, President Betancourt maintained good channels of 
communication with the offic;er corps, informed them of the government's intentions and 
programs, and attempted to insulate the military from politics. 155 
In addition, fears of military involvement in politics were dissipated because the 
armed forces' members were kept busy fighting Cuban-sponsored guerrillas until the 
early 1970's. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN), a guerrilla group,· 
provided the political class with the opportunity to channel military's patriotic feelings 
by assigning them the sacred task of protecting the civilian population from the 
154 Trinkunas, p. 162. 
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uncertainties of fidelista-inspired violence. As proof, although there were five subsequent 
joint civilian and military cuartelazo attempts between 1959 and 1961, the civilian 
government was never seriously challenged by the armed forces. 156 At that time, the 
armed forces, which had always claimed a unique ability to define national values and 
goals and to maintain the institutions of governments, systematically starts to give up the 
notion of being "the repository of political virtue and legitimacy."157 After guerrilla 
defection and pacification, military officers returned peacefully to live a "garrison life," 
accepting politicians as the suitable rulers of the country, at least until the early 1990s. 
C. THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL INTERVENTIONISM WITHIN THE 
ARMED FORCES: THE POLITICAL ELITE'S FAILURES 
1. Birth of EBR200 and Coup Attempts 
Although governability reached its highest point in the first three decades after the 
dictatorship, the very visible governmental mismanagement that accompanied the 
political performance of the democratically elected leaders would eventually undermine 
the stability of the democratic regime in Venezuela. During this period, Venezuelans 
lived under a rentier-state that collected few taxes, and depended on their oil income, 
which never reached a desired point of development. 158 This meant several economic 
crises, such as devaluation, inflation, and a large fiscal deficit, that were reflected in 
155 Trinkunas, p. 176. 
156 Taylor, Jr., p. 69. 
157 Betancourt, p.p. 836-837. 
158 Karl, Terry L., The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, (Standford, CA, University of 
California Press, 1998), p. 36. 
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poverty, unemployment, and scarcity. These consequences were significant factors of the 
social disequilibrium. 159 For the armed forces, it meant corruption within the higher 
ranks, budgetary outlays, and politicization of the promotion system, which began to 
disturb its stability. 160 
In this context of economic, political, social, and military crisis one can explain 
the ideological motivation for military intervention in Venezuela's political life, 
beginning with the birth of the Ejercito Bolivariano 200, or EB200 (Bolivarian Army 
200). 
Created as a faction of the 42th Brigade of Paratroopers of the Venezuelan Army, 
the EBR200 was founded on July 24, 1983, a date with high patriotic significance. This 
was the bicentennial of the birth of "The Liberator" Simon Bolfvar, which undoubtedly 
highlighted the nationalistic character of the organization. Its leaders were mostly elite 
officers that had graduated from the Venezuelan Military Academy in the classes of 1973 
and 1974, the first among all the services to obtain a college degree. Among them were 
Hugo Chavez Frfas, Francisco Arias Cardenas, and Felipe Acosta Carles. The former, 
Hugo Chavez, 17 years later, would become a famous leader of the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Bolivariano 200, or MRB200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement). 
Here, the matter of professionalism that had helped to keep the military away from 
politics for at least three decades, became a sort of double-edged sword. In the aftermath 
of the democratic transition of 1958, improvements in the education and training had 
159 Mainwaring and Scully, p. 43. 
160 Arcenaux, Graig, "Dramatic Consolidation or Reconsolidation?: Military Doctrine and the 1992 
Military Unrest in Venezuela," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, (Summer 1996), p. 70. 
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made military officers more accepting of civilian control over the military instead of their 
own direct political participation. However, as military officers begin to receive more 
training in some areas (political science, legal and judiciary matters, security and defense) 
they felt the right to participate in politics. 
To expand the ideological concept of the movement, the leaders of the EBR200 
created generational ties with more junior officers through teaching military courses in 
the Academia Militar (Army Academy). This allowed them to gain more followers while 
indoctrinating younger officers. 161 All the officers of the EBR200 were known for their 
devoted admiration to the Bolivarian ideals, their patriotism and for their "outspoken 
critical approach." 162 
Moreover, the bloody and traumatic urban riots on February 27, 1989 would have 
a significant impact within the movement. This event by itself in combination with the 
death of Maj. Acosta Carles during these riots, one of the most influential leaders, 
evolved the EBR200 into the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200, or MBR200 
(Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement). 
For the new MBR200, the 1989 riots and their aftermath added impetus to the 
movement. In addition, corruption within the Carlos Andres Perez administration and his 
mismanagement of military issues had become constant concerns of the movement. As 
Deborah L. Norden highlighted when referring to the latter point, the MBR200 members 
"took offense at the apparently politicized nature of promotions and appointments, a 
161 Norden, Deborah L., "The Organizational Dynamics of Militaries and Military Movements: Paths to 
Power in Venezuela," paper presented at the Conference on Soldiers and Democracy, Riverside, Ca, 
University of California, February 1998, p.p. 22-23 
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practice related to the democratic regime's strategy for civilian control."
163 Furthermore, 
Perez's "soft" position to deal with Colombian territorial claims over the Venezuelan 
Gulf, a very sensitive military issue, was considered by the armed forces as a real threat 
for the Venezuelan sovereignty. This situation would change the movement's goals from 
a solely military accounting to a broader patriotic mission of saving Venezuela from the 
socio-economic, and political (internal and external) chaos. 
As Brian Loveman argues: 
Militaries [in Latin America] have recognized publicly their 
subordination to civilians, except when civilians are perceived to have 
exceeded their authority or put at risk national values, interest, and 
security that the armed forces are sworn to defend or when civilian 
political system has failed to settle. 164 
In 1992, according to Arias Cardenas, one of MBR200 leaders, there was enough 
motivation for the movement's members to challenge the government, which encouraged 
the MBR to accelerate their plans. Surprisingly or not, this moment would arrive on 
February 4, 1992, in a violent form: a coup d'etat attempt. 165 
In this coup d'etat attempt, Chavez and the leaders of the MBR200 invoked the 
same patriotic feelings as Liberators and caudillos did during the independence and post-
independence era. They argued that participating 1n the political fate of Venezuela was a 
just and sacred cause. 
162 Arceneaux, p.70. 
163 Norden, p.24. 
164 Loveman, xiv. 
165 Ibid. 
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This point was evidenced when Lt. Colonel Hugo Chavez Frias justified the 
rebellion of February 4, 1992, with the following argument: 
While the constitution holds that the military had the duty to 'ensure 
democratic stability,' the MBR200 believes its duty to evaluate whether 
or not the government of Carlos Andres Perez was illegitimate, the 
MBR200 decided to remove him from office.... the willingness of 
President Perez to negotiate with Colombia on border issues, became a 
matter of national sovereignty. Therefore, it was the constitutional duty 
of the MBR200 to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation. 166 
In the aftermath of both military uprisings, the popularity of the coup leaders 
increased significantly, in particular, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez became something 
of a national hero. His participation in the failed attempt to take over the presidential 
palace of Miraflores will endure in the minds of Venezuelans, especially by means of his 
famous speech to the media in the aftermath of the military uprising. This would presage 
his future involvement in politics. The speech, translated by the author, was as follows: 
First of all, I want to wish a good day to all the people of Venezuela and, 
this Bolivarian message is directed to the brave soldiers that are in the 
Regiment of Paratroopers of Aragua, and the armor Brigade of Valencia. 
jComrades! 
Sadly ... [By] now ... the objectives that were pursued were not 
achieved in the capital. It means that, we here in Caracas, did not 
achieve control. You did a good job there. But, it is time to avoid more 
bloodshed. It is time for reflection; there will be the new opportunities 
and the country must take the better course. Listen to my words, listen to 
the Comandante Chavez, that sends you this message so you will give up 
your weapons, because the objectives planned nationally would not be 
possible now. 
jComrades! 
Listen to this message of solidarity. I thank you for your loyalty, I 
thank you for your valor, and your unselfishness and I, before all the 
166 Zago, Angela, "La Rebeli6n de los Angeles," in Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Nos Alwmos por Ia 
Constitution: Carta de los Oficiales Bolivarianos, Caracas, Fuente Editores, 1992, p. 10. 
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country, assume the responsibility of the Bolivarian Military 
Movement. 167 
This speech crucially represented the birth of the so-called Movimiento Quinta 
Republica, or MVR (Movement Fifth Republic), a political party, which would support 
Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections on December 6, 1998. Chavez was jailed after 
the first coup attempt in 1992, but released at the beginning of Rafael Caldera's 
presidential period in 1994 before his trial had come to a conclusion. Since he was never 
actually convicted, Chavez was eligible to run for office. Hugo Chavez, now a retired 
officer, participated in the political campaign representing the final blow to the 
institutionalized AD-COPEI party system. 168 
2. The Fifth Republic Movement or How Reviving Bolivarianism 
Contributed to Hugo Chavez's Victory 
Taking advantage of this widespread disillusionment, Hugo Chavez was able to 
use Bolivarian symbolism to incline the populace's mindset toward his political cause. In 
fact, his support began a dramatic ascent from an initial 6 percent to 39 percent by August 
1998, just three month before the elections. By using the same strategy for attracting and 
manipulating Venezuelan's minds as Juan Vicente Gomez did during his 35-year 
dictatorship, Chavez claimed to be inspired by Simon Bolivar and other Venezuelan 
independence heroes. In fact, he had transformed the Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Movement (MBR200), founded with other military members of the class in 1982, into the 
167 Words expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez in national television the fourth of February of 
1992, EI Universal Digital, "Direcci6n Nacional Politico-Electoral del Movimiento V Republica," 10 
October 1998. Available [Online]:HYPERLINK "http://www.4f.org/4febrero.htm" http://www.el-
universal.com. [10 October 1998]. 
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Movimiento Quinta Republica or MVR (Fifth Republic Movement), 169 which advocated 
the reformulation of Venezuelan democracy and the purge of the country of a debilitating 
and pervasive corruption. Since the Venezuelan armed forces was an organization with a 
high grade of credibility and accountability among other institutions-comparable to the 
Church-the backing of a movement with its origins in the military helped make Chavez a 
more attractive political option. 
The MVR members attempted to capitalize on the military reputation by using 
diverse elements related to the Venezuelan army uniform as the main symbols of electoral 
propaganda. The red beret, used by the Army's airborne troops during the February 4, 
1992 coup d'etat attempt, and later forbidden by the government, was a major symbol. In 
addition, Chavez's constant populist references to Simon Bolivar's expressions during his 
speeches also helped to form a "liberator" image within the lowest class. Thus, Chavez's 
image of being a former member of what has been considered a glorious heritage from 
the Ejercito Libertador (Liberator Army) of the nineteenth century's independence won 
the sympathy of many voters. 
Likewise, as Gomez also did, Chavez took advantage of historic dates related to 
the independence heroes but now with electoral purposes. By announcing his candidacy 
on July 24, 1998, the 2151h commemoration of Simon Bolivar's birth, Chavez not only 
reinforced his "liberator" image, but also began to challenge the other contenders' 
political strategy of labeling him an authoritarian, given his previous participation in the 
168 Mainwaring and Scully, ibid. 
169 According to MVR leaders, it is the Fifth Republic because the first was lost to the Spaniard in 1811. 
The second was lost to the dictatorship of Jose Antonio Paez in 1830. The Third Republic was lost in 
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military uprisings. For both purposes, when talking to the Venezu
elans who were present 
during this official act, Hugo Chavez gave an impressive speech. 
It was translated by the 
author, as follows: 
On this 241h of July it is showed that Bolfvar has not died becaus
e he is 
present in the heart of millions of Venezuelans. The true comma
nder of 
all nations born 215 years ago, in his memory [we] dedicate the triumph 
of the people the next 6th of December. I did come from violent ways
, 
did I not? I am not going to deny it, I never denied it and I never wa
nted 
to deny it... I declare that the moment of peace, the embrace, and
 the 
love has arrived. I beg God to give to strength... in this moment 
of 
reappearance, in this hour of democracy, and in this hour of a new
 era.
170 
These Bolivarian ideals of "saving" La patria would con
tinue positively 
motivating Chavez and his followers for the rest of the campaig
n. In fact, the last poll 
figures before the election showed Chavez leading 57 perce
nt to 26 percent over 
Henrique Salas Romer, an independent candidate. The impo
verished Venezuelans, 
surfeited with all that represented puntofijismo, the old political establishment, would
 see 
in Hugo Chavez a sort of messiah who could rescue the endange
red fate of the country. 
Both his previous military participation in politics and the Boliva
rian image of liberator 
reinforced in the populace a collective sensation "to finish the u
nfinished," stimulating 
voters to make what they consider a necessary change. This in con
junction with the use of 
Bolivarian symbolism would enforce the population mindset of se
eing Chavez as a savior 
of lq patria. 
the coup of 1945 against Isafas Medina Angarita, and the Fou
rth Republic by the puntofijista 
governments. 
170 Delgado-Mijares, Yeneiza, "Vengo de la Violencia pero Garantizo el Carnbio en Paz
," El Nacional, 
Polftica, 0725/98. 
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As Alberto Muller Rojas says, "Faced with these circumstances [socio-economic 
hardships], the population-following the more salient features of its political 
culture-turns its glance to the military with the hope of any intervention that might put an 
end to the mismanagement that is progressively and continually affecting the social 
order."171 
Unbelievably for many Venezuelans, the former Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez 
Frias won the presidential elections of December 1998. As Juan Liscano would comment 
in an attempt to explain such a "rare" elector31 outcome: "The election is done and the 
former lieutenant colonel has won. His personality, his promises, his link with the magic-
religious bolivarianism, the mistakes of his political contenders... the decadence of 
traditional parties ... opened completely the doors of the way to the presidency in the midst 
of the Punto Fijo pact's collapse .... "172 
171 Muller Rojas, Alberto, Relaciones Peligrosas: Militares, Pol{tica, y Estado, Fondo Editorial 
APUCV/IPP, Fondo Editorial Tropykos, Fundacion Gual y Espafia, Caracas, 1992, p. 77. 
172 Liscano, Juan, "Recuento sin Respuesta," El Nacional, Opinion, 22112/99. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
As seen, in the search for elements that could explain the Hugo Chavez Frias' 
presidential victory as a political phenomenon, the use of a single approach does not 
provide for accurate conclusions. From a holistic perspective, the study of this 
phenomenon from three approaches-economic, cultural, and institutional-provides a 
fuller explanation. This concluding chapter will weigh the relative importance of each 
variable and the contribution each makes to an explanation of the electoral victory of 
Hugo Chavez in 1998. 
The institutional approach suggests how the progressive deinstitutionalization of 
the two-party system fostered the appearance of political outsiders able to compete 
successfully in presidential elections. Civilian politicians of the traditional parties had 
achieved a predominant status in the political arena, particularly since the end of the 
Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958. AD and COPEI institutionalized a two-party system 
by creating strong roots in society, stable interparty competition, legitimacy among the 
population, and stable rules and structures, which ensured their total hegemony in 
politics. This allowed them to keep away the specter of the authoritarianism or any 
military participation in politics for a long time. However, the very institutionalized 
nature of the party system made it unable to deal with economic crisis. Despite efforts to 
right the economy by applying neoliberal economic measures, rentier groups "sabotaged" 
reforms when they perceived that the tradition of broad political consultation was 
deliberately abandoned and their economic interests affected. 
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This inability to cope with economic and social hardships contributed greatly to 
the deinstitutionalization of the two-party system. It would be popularly expressed 
through violent events (urban riots in 1989, and two coups d'etat attempts in 1992). In 
1993, more peacefully, the presidential election of Rafael Caldera, considered a semi-
outsider unlinked to traditional parties, was the beginning of the end of a consolidated 
"partyarchy." However, when Caldera adopted economic and political strategies that 
previously had characterized the 1958-1993 puntofijismo, Venezuelans became 
disenchanted with what they had considered their last political hope. They increasingly 
rejected anyone associated with traditional political parties. As a result, new political 
outsiders, in the form of individuals and groups, would capture the voter's attention in the 
next election. Hugo Chavez, taking advantage of this agitated political panorama, 
campaigned and won the 1998 presidential elections. 
As explained so far, the deinstitutionalization of the party system's that provided 
the opening for outsiders like Hugo Chavez to come to power was closely linked to 
economic crisis. Most Latin America countries have experienced economic crisis in the 
1980s and 1990s but not all have experienced the collapse of their party systems. To 
understand why this happened in Venezuela, it is important to understand two points: the 
illusion of progress created by the country's oil wealth and the way the overly 
institutionalized party system blocked economic reforms. 
Thoroughly related to the previous approach, the economic perspective allows us 
to understand how the decline of an "artificial" govemability, created by the pacted nature 
of the 1958 democratic transition and supported by enormous oil revenues, not only 
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affected political stability, but also opened a "window of political opportunity" for 
Chavez. By spending the· national budget on ambitious projects, politicians had created 
the illusion of developing the country while doing the opposite. That kept Venezuelan 
society moderately satisfied for a long period, and the armed forces could believe that the 
political class was an elite capable of managing and directing the economic fate of the 
country. However, once the economic situation acquired unbearable dimensions for the 
state, economic mismanagement, corruption, and progressive social deterioration led to 
violent demonstrations: urban riots in 1989, and two bloody coups d'etat attempts in 
1992. 
On the other hand, the institutionalized character of the party system blocked any 
"insider" to address the economic crisis so long as rentier groups were not co-opted to 
support reforms. Despite poor prospects for the survival of the democratic regime after 
1992, economic policies generated by future governments did little to fulfill Venezuelan 
expectations. Caldera, promising to reverse the problem, just achieved a partial return to 
what Venezuelans were accustomed to: an economic model based on oil rents. Thus, 
Hugo Chavez, a coup leader in 1992, was perceived by an impoverished populace as the 
necessary agent for ending the economic stalemate. 
Finally, the cultural approach explains why a former military man was in a 
position to take advantage of the deinstitutionalization of the party system and be elected 
president. The heroic and liberating actions of the Venezuelan Army during the 
Independence Wars led Venezuelan officers to consider themselves as saviors of Ia patria 
(the fatherland), who must protect it from inefficiency and corrupt politicians. Politicians, 
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realizing this, worked in coordination to achieve suitable civilian control over military 
after the 1958 democratic transition. Modernization, indoctrination, and 
professionalization were useful for keeping the armed forces away from political 
participation. However, political failures led to the armed forces' politicization, and 
increasing levels of corruption and mismanagement awoke anti-political sentiments in the 
military. Two failed coup attempts in 1992 were the violent consequence of these 
feelings. Hugo Chavez, a former army lieutenant colonel and leader of one of the military 
uprisings, used Bolivarian and Army cultural symbols, to become a more attractive 
electoral option for disillusioned voters. The impoverished Venezuelans, fed up with all 
that represented puntofijismo, the old political establishment, would see in Hugo Chavez 
a sort of messiah who could rescue the endangered fate of the country. Venezuelans 
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